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Louisiana Family Law
Christopher L. Blakesley*
CHILD SUPPORT
Child Support
It is axiomatic now that the obligation of child support is mutual.'
Either party may raise the issue during the divorce proceeding or there-
after, without being appointed tutor of the child.2 Generally, the custodial
or soon-to-be custodial parent will seek child support. Also, child support
may be litigated, when the spouses are living separate and apart, even
if not incidental to a divorce action? If a person who is required to
provide alimony is or becomes unable to do so by reason of fortuitous
events or other circumstances beyond his control, such as the loss of
his employment position or illness, relief will be granted. "lIlt would
be highly unjust to exact from the obligor a strict compliance with his
duty under those conditions."' The parent(s)' ability to pay child support,
however, has been broadly construed, and the parent must be virtually
unemployable before he or she will be excused, although the expense
of a second family may be taken into consideration.'
Taking on additional obligations, however, provides no excuse. A
voluntary act by a parent which renders it difficult or impossible for
him to perform his primary child support obligation cannot be coun-
tenanced as a ground, wholly or partially, for relief from the obligation. 6
Where a paying parent has undertaken additional obligations, including
Copyright 1992, by LoutsM4A LAW REvIEw.
J.Y. Sanders Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. See generally Wardle, Blakesley, & Parker, Contemporary Family Law: Prin-
ciples, Policy & Practice (4 vols. 1988), covering family law in all fifty states. More
detailed analysis of the subjects presented herein as well as others may be found in the
author's upcoming book, Louisiana Family Law (Butterworths 1992).
1. -La. Civ. Code art. 227; Desormeaux v. Montgomery, 576 So. 2d 1158. 1159 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1991) ("Fathers and mothers have a mutual obligation to provide for the
support, maintenance, and education of their children.").
2. La. Civ. Code art. 105.
3. La. R.S. 9:291 (1991).
4. Laiche v. Laiche, 237 La. 298, 304, I1 So. 2d 120, 122 (1959).
5. Vidrine v. Vidrine, 567 So. 2d 811, 814 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
6. Toups v. Toups, 573 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
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marrying again and fathering other children, he will not be excused
from his primary obligation to support his non-custodial child. This, of
course, gives a privileged position to the children of the first marriage,
raising the question of whether this preference for one's first family is
constitutional? The South Dakota Supreme Court recently rejected an
equal protection attack on this preference. 7 Only a fortuitous change in
circumstances serves to relieve a parent, support-obligor, of his support
obligation.8
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in 1959 that Civil Code article
232 requires an involuntary condition.9 Even being in jail as a result
of alcohol or drug abuse, or both, may not be used as an excuse to
escape the financial consequences of defendant's voluntary actions.,'
Further, an obligor cannot neglect to pay child support and then claim
a change in circumstances when a judgment for arrearages is made
executory, and his wages are garnished to pay those arrearages." Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 9:311(B) provides: "A judgment for past support
shall not of itself constitute a change in circumstances of the obligor
sufficient to reduce an existing award of support." It would be contrary
to the letter and spirit of the law to conclude that one required to pay
alimony should be relieved therefrom, either in whole or in part, when
he has brought about his own unstable financial condition by voluntarily
incurring subsequent obligations, secondary to the alimony obligation,
which render him unable to meet that obligation.
Child Support Guidelines
Child support awards traditionally have been woefully inadequate,
so a change was needed. Prior to the advent of the child support
guidelines, to be discussed infra, support entitlement and amount were
governed by judicial discretion, through the use of a vague formula
balancing the child's needs and the obligor's ability to pay. 2 In an
7. Feltman v. Feltman, 434 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1989); see I. M. ElIman, P. Kurtz,
and K. Bartlett, Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 391 (2d ed. 1991); Note, Second
Children Second Best? Equal Protection for Successive Families Under State Child Support
Guidelines, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 881 (1991).
8. Lustig v. Lustig, 552 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
9. Laiche v. Laiche, 237 La. 298, 111 So. 2d 120 (1959).
10. Vidrine v. Vidrine, 567 So. 2d 811, 814 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Salazar v.
Salazar, 582 So. 2d 374, 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
I1. Kirby v. Kirby, 579 So. 2d 508, 518 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 582 So.
2d 1308 (1991).
12. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current
Practice, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 49, 50 (1982); Note, The Child Support Standards Act
and the New York Judiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent Solution, 56 Brooklyn L. Rev.
1299, 1304 (1991).
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effort to bring adequacy, consistency and efficiency to child support
collection, and to improve the dismal record of child support awards
and enforcement, the United States Congress mandated that every state
adopt child support guidelines by October 1, 1988.11 The guidelines are
designed to eliminate forum shopping, create consistent judgments, foster
more settlements and reduce the number of contested cases. They are
to be used in any initial or modification child support action. 4 The
guidelines have been the catalyst of a virtual revolution in the process
of establishing, enforcing and modifying child support." In addition to
the guidelines, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,
and subsequent legislation, provide a series of mandatory remedies to
improve enforcement of child support orders. In 1988, Federal regula-
tions added a requirement that the guidelines be numerical.' 6 The Family
Support Act of 1988 mandated that those charged with setting standards
for child support in each state use mathematical guidelines as a rebuttable
presumption of the appropriate child support award by. October 13,
1989."1
Louisiana's guidelines are found in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315-
9:315.14 (effective October 1989).'" In 1991, a new schedule for child
support was adopted for use in determining the basic child support
obligation. 9 The guidelines are to be reviewed every four years, and
after 1994, awards will be automatically reviewed and adjusted for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Louisiana's guidelines are
based on an income share formula.2 0 The amount of support is based
13. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 103; 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
667(a) (Supp. 1991)).
14. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) (1991); Carroll v. Carroll, 577 So. 2d 1140, 1145-46 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991).
15. Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. Am. Acad. Matrim.
L. 103 (1990); see generally I Development of Guidelines for Child Support Orders, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Twelfth
Annual Report to Congress for Period Ending September 30, 1987 at 7 (1988); Mun-
stermann, Grimm, Henderson & Semiatin, Child Support Guidelines: A Compendium
(1990). See also Dodson, A Guide to the Guidelines: New Child Support Rules are Helping
Custodial Parents Bridge the Financial Gap, 10 Fain. Advoc. No. 4 (1988); Billings, From
Guesswork to Guidelines-the Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in Utah,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 859 (1989).
16. 45 C.F.R. 302.56(c) (1990); Elrod, supra note 15, at 104.
17. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) (1991); e.g., Crockett v. Crockett, 575 So. 2d 942 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 103; 102 Stat. 2346
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (Supp. 1991)); Elrod, supra note 15, at 104.
18. Louisiana Child Support and Paternity Provisions (Guidelines) are found in La.
R.S. 9:315-315.14 (1991).
19. La. R.S. 9:315.14 (1991).
20. La. R.S. 9:315.8 (1991). In 1991, new numbers were put into the schedule, found
in La. R.S. 9:315.14.
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on the needs of the children and the means available to the parents."
The total child support obligation shall be determined by adding together
the basic child support obligation amount, the net child care costs, the
cost of health insurance premiums, extraordinary medical expenses, and
other extraordinary expenses. Each of these terms is defined in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:315. A deduction, if any, for a child's income shall
be subtracted from the amount calculated (the remainder is the child
support obligation). Each party's share is determined by multiplying his
or her percentage share of combined adjusted gross income times the
total child support obligation. The party not having custody pays a
money judgment, minus any court-ordered direct payments made on
behalf of the child or for work related net child care, costs, health
insurance premiums, extraordinary medical expenses, or other extraor-
dinary expenses, provided as adjustments to the schedule. If, in working
this out, the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds the
highest level specified in the schedule, the court shall use its discretion
in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation, but in no
event shall it be less than the highest amount set forth in the schedule.22
For joint custody, the court may consider the period of time spent with
each parent (including the non-domiciliary parent). 23
Since October 1989, the amount determined by the guideline formula
adopted in Louisiana has been presumed to be in the best interest of
the child. The presumption may be rebutted by good cause showing
that the application of the guidelines will not be appropriate and will
be unjust; the guidelines will not be applied if the parties agree to an
alternative arrangement that is found to be in the best interest of the
child(ren), The court may deviate from the guidelines if their application
would not be in the best interest of the child or would be inequitable
to the parties, but the court is required to give oral or written reasons
for any deviation. The reasons are to be made part of the record of
the proceedings.2" The decision to deviate from the guidelines may include
consideration of several factors listed in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:315.1(C)(1-7). The judge, however, cannot deviate from the guidelines
because there was a previous judgment for a lower child support amount.
Thus, simply stating that an inequity exists or that a prior judgment in
21. Toups v. Toups, 573 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
22. La. R.S. 9:315.10(B) (1991).
23. La. R.S. 9:315.8(A-E) (1991).
24. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A), (B) and (D) (1991); see Spaht, Developments and Proposed
Developments in Custody and Child Support, Separation and Divorce, Lecture for the
Louisiana Judicial College, San Destin Summer School, June 6, 1989.
25. La. R.S. 9:315.1(B) and (C) (1991); Montgomery v. Waller, 571 So. 2d 765, 767
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
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a lesser amount exists will not suffice to allow a judge to deviate
downward from the amount the guidelines would establish.26
Factors or Considerations
Child support should be based on the "circumstances" of the paying
parent, not just his income. His circumstances are properly determined
only by consideration of all of his resources, as well as all the resources
of his present spouse." May the court consider an obligor's new spouse's
contributions to the non-custodial parent's marriage? Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:315(6)(c) was amended in 1991, to read: "The court may also
consider as income the benefits a party derives from expense-sharing or
other sources; however, in determining the benefits of expense-sharing,
the court shall not consider the income of another spouse, regardless
of the legal regime under which the remarriage exists, except to the
extent that such income is used directly to reduce the cost of a party's
actual expenses."2
Prior to this amendment, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
had held that a trial judge's refusal to consider evidence concerning the
income and contributions to expenses of the noncustodial parent's second
marriage made by his second spouse was error.
It is inconsistent with the concept of separate property regimes
to lump the second spouse's income together with the obligor
spouse's where they are separate in property. At the same time,
it is appropriate to consider evidence that the second spouse
contributes to the expenses of the second marriage, where such
evidence is presented. Where that evidence is not available, under
the language of C.C. article 2373 we must presume that the
second spouse contributes in proportion to his or her income.29
Perhaps the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315(6)(c) was
aimed at this language of the fifth circuit decision. Thus, subsequent
spouses are prompted strongly to establish separate accounts and to
rigorously make it clear that they are living off of their own separate
property. Proof of this separateness will require careful and documented
budgeting.
26. Montgomery, 571 So. 2d at 767-68.
27. Stockstill v. Stockstill, 546 So. 2d 491, 493 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 548
So. 2d 1230 (1989).
28. La. R.S. 9:315(6)(c), Act 854, of the 1991 Regular Session (emphasis added);
Crockett v. Crockett, 575 So. 2d 942, 944 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (holding it to be
appropriate to consider the new spouse's income where equitable).
29. Fleishmann v. Fleishmann, 538 So. 2d 306, 309 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (italicized
language is apparently overruled by the language of new La. R.S. 9:315(6)(c), 1991 La.
Acts No. 854).
19921
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Modification or Termination of A ward
The jurisprudential test for modification is codified in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:311(A). It provides that an award of child support
may be modified if the circumstances of "one of the parties," presum-
ably the child or either parent, change and shall be terminated upon
proof that it has become unnecessary. 0 It places the burden on the
party seeking a change to prove a change in circumstances of either
party since the time of the previous award. 3 The modification of a
child support award, however, is within the sole discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion.,2 A
child support award may be modified in the following ways: 1) by
judgment from a proper suit for modification; 2) by operation of law
(e.g., minor reaches majority); or 3) by a conventional agreement between
the parties suspending the support award." A child support obligation
will end automatically when the child in question reaches majority or
is emancipated, or under an in globo award, when the youngest of a
set of children reaches majority."' Should a parent establish that he or
she is unable to meet the child support obligation imposed, a reduction
or discharge is possible by establishing in court that he or she has
experienced a change in circumstances since the time of the award."
Once the moving parent makes a prima facie case of a change in
circumstances warranting a reduction or termination of the support
award, the burden shifts to the other party to establish that the change
was caused by the movant's voluntary action or to prove other facts
which require that the support obligation remain the same.3
Courts have considered such factors as: 1) another child reaching
majority; 2) the lifestyles of both parties; 3) the reduction of defendant's
income due to retirement; 4) the impact of defendant's tax liability on
disposable income; 5) the assets available to plaintiff not being utilized;
and 6) the plaintiff's lack of any attempt to seek employment during
30. Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 283 So. 2d 226 (La. 1973).
31. La. R.S. 9:311(A) (1991); Mathers v. Mathers, 579 So. 2d 503, 504-05 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1991).
32. Mathers, 579 So. 2d at 505.
33. Moga v. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980); Halcomb v. Halcomb, 352 So. 2d
1013 (La. 1977); Tuey v. Tuey, 546 So. 2d 235, 238 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Lavergne
v. Lavergne, 556 So. 2d 918, 920 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
34. La. R.S. 9:309(A) and (B) (1991); see Timm v. Timm, 511 So. 2d 838, 840 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987) ("Clearly, in an in globo award there is not an automatic termination
of a portion of the child support when one of the children reaches majority. The father
is not entitled to reduce his payments on a pro-rata basis without seeking court modification
of the judgment.").
35. La. Civ. Code art. 232; La. R.S. 9:311(A) (1991); Toups v. Toups, 573 So. 2d
1164, 1167 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
36. Toups, 573 So. 2d at 1167.
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the number of years since separation. 7 Where a parent took the child
three days, rather than two days, per week was held not to be sufficient
to indicate a reduction in child support." On the other hand, if the
amount of support being paid by the paying spouse is less than one-
half of the "allowable needs" of the child or children, it may be that
the increased income of the recipient parent will not be sufficient to
warrant a modification of the paying spouse's obligation.39
Termination or Modification and Consent Agreements
Parties may agree to modify child support and such an agreement
shall be given effect, if the parties clearly agree 4° and "if it is in the
best interest of the child.""' The fourth circuit "has recognized the right
of the parties to modify or terminate child support payments by con-
ventional agreement . . . [although] a contradictory motion is the pref-
erable procedure." '4 2 The fourth circuit also recognized "that alimony
could be established by private agreement and without judicial pro-
ceedings." ' 43 This is consistent with the standard of proof required by
Moga v. Dubroc,"4 where the Louisiana Supreme Court first departed
from the old rule that a discharge from the obligation to pay child
support may be granted only by a suit or in an answer to a suit to
enforce payment. The court held a parent may suspend the right to
collect child support where the agreement to do so is clearly evidenced
by turning the child over to the obligor parent. The agreement, however,
may not thwart the enforcement of the child's right to support. A parent
owes a duty to his children and the public, which he cannot erase by
entering into an agreement. "Neither the parents nor a court decree can
permanently set aside the duty of support. '45 To be enforceable, the
parties must clearly agree to that modification." Mere acquiescence in
the obligor's failure to make payments is not a waiver. 47
37. Ballanco v. Ballanco, 538 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
38. Mathers v. Mathers, 579 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
39. See id. at 506 (concurring opinion); Owens v. Owens, 489 So. 2d 321 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986).
40. Lavergne v. Lavergne, 556 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
41. Robinson v. Robinson, 561 So. 2d 966, 967 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
566 So. 2d 985 (1990).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 967-68.
44. 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980).
45. Id. at 380 n.3.
46. Lavergne v. Lavergne, 556 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
47. Id. at 921.
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Application of Child Support Guidelines and Modification of Child
Support
The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments, which were
enacted by Congress and called for the child support guidelines, did not
indicate whether the adoption of the guidelines alone should be a suf-
ficient change in circumstances to allow a modification of a pre-existing
child support award. A question to be addressed is whether the prom-
ulgation and/or application of the guidelines provide, in themselves, a
change of circumstances sufficient to allow modification of a child
support award rendered prior to the promulgation of the guidelines.
Does an increased child support amount derived by application of the
guidelines constitute a change of circumstances which permits a modi-
fication of child support?
States took differing approaches. Some promulgated guidelines which
provided expressly that their adoption was a change in circumstances."8
Other states provided that, if the application of the guidelines indicated
an amount of child support a certain percentage different from the
extant amount, it would be a sufficient change of circumstances. 49 Still
other states continued to insist on initial proof of a change in circum-
stances independent of the promulgation or application of the guide-
lines.50
48. See Elrod, supra note 15, at 123, notes California, South Dakota, and Texas as
examples (although Texas appears to require that the application of the guidelines must
establish a sufficient difference from the extant amount to allow a modification. Tex.
Fain. Code Ann. § 14.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Elrod states:
'The court may consider the guidelines for the support of a child in this chapter
to determine whether there has been a material and substantial change in
circumstances under Section 14.08(c)(2) .... However, an increase in the needs,
standard of living, or lifestyle of the obligee since the rendering of the existing
order does not warrant an increase in the obligor's child support obligation. If
the amount of support of a child contained in the order sought to be modified
is not in substantial compliance with the guidelines, this may warrant a mod-
ification of a prior order in accordance with the guidelines if the modification
is in the best interest of the child.
Elrod, supra note 15, at 123 (emphasis added)). See Ramsey, Modification of Child
Support: Making the Mother Pay, 52 Tex. B.J. 638, 640 (1989); citing, Sampson & Davis,
A Brief, Expurgated History of the Recommendations of the Child Support Advisory
Committee, State Bar Section Report, Family Law, 87-1, at 11. The guidelines are found
in Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 14.052-.058 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
49. Elrod, supra note 15, at 123, noting: Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, Rhode
Island, and Vermont.
50. E.g., Miller v. Miller, 415 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (applying'
Minn. Stat. § 518.64(2)(a) (Supp. 1992), which requires the trial court to determine whether
there has been a substantial change in circumstances based on statutory factors to warrant
modification, after which, the guidelines will be applied).
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Louisiana child support guidelines are applicable to initial awards
or modifications of child support filed after October 1, 1989.11 Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:311(A) provides that: "An award for support shall
not be reduced or increased unless the party seeking the reduction or
increase shows a change in circumstances of one of the parties between
the time of the previous award and the time of the motion for mod-
ification of the award." '3 2 The guidelines apply to determine the amount
of support upon modification, when circumstances have changed sig-
nificantly since the original award." In most instances, the application
of the guidelines generally provides more support than was obtained
under the prior discretionary method of awarding support.
Once the change of circumstances is established, it is error not to
apply the guidelines or not to indicate on the record the reasons for
deviation.14 Although the Louisiana guidelines apply to modification
actions brought since their effective date, and although they create a
rebuttable presumption that the amount calculated under the guidelines
is the proper amount of support," the guidelines were not made ret-
roactive. It does not appear that they were intended to alone create a
change of circumstances to awards rendered prior to their effective date. 6
The necessity of proving a change of circumstances apart from the
promulgation of the guidelines is reinforced by Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 9:315.11, which provides that, "[t]he enactment of this Part [the
guidelines] shall not for that reason alone be considered a change in
the circumstances of either party."" The guidelines apply to a modi-
fication action filed after their effective date (October 1, 1989), as long
as the movant proves a significant change in material circumstances
independent of the promulgation of the guidelines.
What sort of change of circumstances is contemplated? Some other
states have promulgated statutes explicitly providing that the application
51. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) (1991); Crockett v. Crockett, 575 So. 2d 942, 944 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991).
52. La. R.S. 9:311(A) (1991); see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 543 So. 2d 128, 130 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1989) (it was error to increase a father's child support obligation when
there was no evidence to show a change in the mother's or children's expenses since the
date of the divorce); Arender v. Houston, 540 So. 2d 439, 440 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989)
(a support award shall not be reduced or increased, unless the party seeking the modification
shows a change in circumstances warranting the modification).
53. La. R.S. 9:311(A), 9:315.1(A) (1991); see Watson v. Hampton, 569 So. 2d 635,
637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
54. La. R.S. 9:315.1(B) (1991); Crockett, 575 So. 2d at 944; Montgomery v. Waller,
571 So. 2d 765, 767 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
55. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) (1991).
56. See La. R.S. 9:311 and 315.1 (1991).
57. La. R.S. 9:315.11 (1991), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 9, § I, 2d Ex. Sess., eff.
Oct. I, 1989.
1992]
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of their guidelines alone will constitute a presumption of changed cir-
cumstances, when their application establishes a difference of 107o (some
provide 2007o) in the award. The Louisiana legislature did not include
such a provision in the Louisiana guidelines. More detail on this approach
and its comparison with Louisiana law will be presented below. First,
however, a discussion of the nature and direction of the change in
circumstances required in a given case is necessary.
Does Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:311 require that the modification
of a child support award be in the direction indicated by the change
of circumstances, or just that there be a change? For example, what if
recipient's income had risen since an award of child support rendered
prior to the effective date of the guidelines? This is a change of cir-
cumstances. If the application of the guidelines would provide greater
child support than the prior award, would a court be justified in applying
the guidelines? If the application of the guidelines to the circumstances
of a case of a pre-existing award of child support indicates a significant
difference in amount than would have been awarded without the guide-
lines, certainly, a change of circumstances has occurred. Once a change
has occurred, one can argue that the whole issue of child support is
reopened. Any reopening of the issue of child support implicates the
child support guidelines, which are the substantive rule for application
since October 1989.
Louisiana jurisprudence has held that the person moving for a
modification of child support must prove that a material change of
circumstances, relating to the recipient child's needs or the obligor's
ability to pay, has occurred since the support award was made. The
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in 1987 held that it was an
abuse of discretion to allow an increase in child support payments from
a former husband, when the former wife had an increase in her income
and the former husband had a decrease in his income.sa Moreover, any
modification that has been allowed has been one triggered by a change
in circumstances in the direction of the modification. That is, if the
child's needs went up (e.g., the income, etc. of the recipient parent
went down), the award of support was modified upward. To allow any
change, even one where the recipient's needs decreased, to be the basis
of allowing the guidelines to apply (to increase the amount of child
support) seems to fly in the face of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.11
(no change of circumstances intended solely on the basis of the enactment
of the guidelines). To hold otherwise, works to apply the guidelines
retroactively. Moreover, this would cause equal protection difficulties
and ironic inequities: a recipient whose needs remained the same would
58. Carriere v. Alexander, 504 So. 2d 567, 569 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 508
So. 2d 90 (1987).
[Vol. 52
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not be able to succeed in having the guidelines apply, while one whose
needs decreased would be able to trigger the guidelines. Also, the obligor
whose ability to pay decreased would cause the guidelines to apply and
his. or her support obligation would increase, although the obligor who
remained as able as ever to pay would not have to worry about the
application of the guidelines.s9 If the legislature had wanted to make
the guidelines retroactive, or to allow their enactment or application to
constitute a change of circumstances, they could have so indicated.
Models of such an approach were available at that time.
The jurisprudence has disapproved of the notion that child support
obligations could be modified in that manner ° Once an obligor spouse
has proved a change of circumstances warranting a reduction, a pre-
sumption attaches, which must be rebutted by the other party opposing
the reduction.6' Some problematic language is found in Watson v. Hamp-
ton 6 however, where a second circuit panel noted ambiguously in
dictum, that:
given the facts of this case, particularly the hiatus between filing
and judgment and the intervening statutory changes, plaintiff
might have been better served by seeking an increase in child
support, a modification to which the guidelines would apply the
presumptions. Plaintiff would have had the chance to more fully
develop evidence viz a viz the insurance program and its costs,
an opportunity foreclosed on appeal.63
It is not clear whether the panel meant that it believed that the prom-
ulgation of the guidelines itself constituted a sufficient change in cir-
cumstances, or simply that the evidence in the case established a change
in circumstances since the filing, which, in turn, triggered the application
of the guidelines. Only the latter proposition appears appropriate, given
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.11.
A Sampling of Experience in Other Jurisdictions Applying Guidelines
Some states have explicitly provided in their guidelines that, if the
application to the facts in an action for modification brought after a
59. Arender v. Houston, 540 So. 2d 439 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989) (a support award
shall not be reduced or increased, unless the party seeking the modification shows a
change in circumstances warranting the modification); Kaye v. Kaye, 529 So. 2d 879 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 377 (1988) (income reduced from $100,000 per
year to nothing at one point and then to $40,000 per year established a material change
of circumstances which would allow a reduction in child support).
60. Carriere, 504 So. 2d at 569.
61. Kaye v. Kaye, 558 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
62. Watson v. Hampton, 569 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 637.
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specifically stated period of time since the original award indicates a
difference in amount of child support that is at least 10% (some use
20%), it establishes a presumption of sufficient change in circumstances
for modification. Other states do not include such a provision. Unless
there is some explicit limitation on the application of the guidelines to
modify support orders, a reapplication of the guidelines with nothing
more would result in frequent modifications and subvert the policy of
stability.
States With No Built-In Change in Circumstances
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently held that their guide-
lines do not, of themselves, provide a change of circumstances." The
court noted:
the fact that the legislature has enacted child support guidelines
is no reason to alter the permanent stipulation. When the parties
are subject to an existing child support order, particularly when
the terms of the order were negotiated and agreed upon by the
parties, the guidelines are applied only after the trial court has
determined that the standard for modification has been met,
and the relative financial circumstances of the parties have changed
substantially since the order was rendered. 61
In Florida, where the recipient of child support establishes a sig-
nificant change in circumstances since the award, the guidelines are
applicable to determine the proper amount. The Florida guidelines are
expressly applicable to modifications of existing child support orders."
The Florida guidelines, however, also provide that "[t]he guidelines shall
not: 1. [pirovide the basis for proving a substantial change in circum-
stances upon which a modification of an existing order may be
granted .... ",67
The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld a modification of a support
order awarded prior to the enactment of the guidelines." It may be
modified to meet the requisites of the guidelines. The supreme court
held that:
[u]nder the terms -of the statute, the finder of fact is free to
apply the guidelines, or to fix child support on the basis of
64. Morrill v. Millard, 570 A.2d 387, 390 (N.H. 1990).
65. Id. at 390.
66. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(l)(a) (West Supp. 1992); Martinez v. Garcia, 575 So. 2d
1365, 1366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Florida guidelines are expressly applicable in a
proceeding for modification of an existing support order, as long as the modification
action was filed on or after the effective date of the Act promulgating the guidelines.).
67. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(I)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
68. Walker v. Walker, 396 S.E.2d 235 (Ga. 1990).
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appropriate factors other than those reflected in the guide-
lines. . . The statute [guidelines] create[s] no new duty on the
part of the former husband. Neither does it alter his continuing
obligation, which is to provide adequate child support. At the
most, the statute offers a computational reference, which the
finder of fact may apply if it chooses. 9
The trial court had considered the guidelines as a substantive change in
the law that might not be applied retroactively.70 The Georgia Supreme
Court reversed."' The Georgia child support modification statute provides
that: "support ... shall be subject to revision upon petition ... showing
a change in the income and financial status of either former spouse
... or in the needs of the child or children .... No petition [for
modification] may be filed ... within a period of two years from the
date of the final order .... ,,72 The Georgia guidelines do not contain
a provision like that in Louisiana where the enactment of the guidelines
alone does not constitute a change of circumstances."
Some states have modified their guidelines to include a provision
that provides that a modification of a child support order may be made
upon a showing that the extant order deviates by a specified percentage
(generally either 100o or 20%) from what would be the amount deter-
mined by the guidelines.74 For example, Indiana amended its guidelines
in 1990 to provide that after July 1, 1990, modification is to be made
upon a showing that the existing order deviates by more than 200 from
the guidelines amount and the existing order was entered at least 12
months prior to the action." Ohio law provides similarly, with a 10%
difference being sufficient to show a material and significant change of
69. Id. at 236.
70. Id. at 235.
71. Id. at 236; see also Riggs v. Darsey, 396 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. 1990); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 19-6-15(a) (1991).
72. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-6-19(a) (1991).
73. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-6-15(b)(5) (1991).
74. E.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-13(f) (West Supp. 1991) (modification permitted
upon a showing that the original support order differs by more than 20% from the
amount indicated by application of the guidelines, when the pre-existing order was issued
at least twelve months prior to the action for modification). Nelson v. Scalzitti, 563
N.E.2d 166, 167-68 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the action for modification
was filed and heard prior to the effective date of the amendment to the guidelines, so
proof of a change of circumstances independent of the guideline amount applied to the
circumstances was necessary). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-122(l)(b) (1989) (amended
1986); In re Marriage of Pugliese, 761 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), discussed
below.
75. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-13(f) (West Supp. 1991). Nelson, 563 N.E.2d at 167-
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circumstances. 6 This approach seems to have been rejected by the Louis-
iana legislature."
The Colorado guidelines provide that "[i]n any action to . . . modify
child support . . . the child support guideline ... shall be used as a
rebuttable presumption for the establishment or modification of the
amount of child support.""8 They also provide that "[aipplication of
the child support guideline ... to the circumstances of the parties at
the time of the filing of the motion for modification of the child support
order which results in less than a ten percent change in the amount of
support due per month shall be deemed not to be a substantial and
continuing change of circumstances.' ' 9 A Colorado appellate court read
the guidelines to create a rebuttable presumption of a substantial and
continuing change of circumstances whenever the application of the
guidelines would amount to "more than a 10 percent change in the
amount of support due." ' 0 It reasoned that although the guidelines are
to be applied in modification cases"' and although the change in cir-
cumstances must be substantial and continuing for modification,82 the
legislature's mandate, that the "[application of the child support guide-
line . . . to the circumstances of the parties at the time of the filing of
a motion for modification of the child support order.which results in
less than a ten percent change in the amount of support due per month
shall be deemed not to be a substantial and continuing change in
circumstances," 3 establishes a rebuttable presumption that a modifica-
tion of child support must be granted whenever application of the child
support guidelines would result in more than a 10% change in the
amount of support due. 4 Another Colorado appellate court noted, in
a case where the father had assumed custody of a child who had
previously been in the custody of the mother but who had agreed to
"waive" child support, that "the child support guidelines created a
rebuttable presumption that a change of circumstances existed here." 5
The court held that the change of custody, in light of the guidelines,
created the rebuttable presumption. It noted that the Colorado statute
76. Rohrbach v. Rohrbach, 40 Ohio App. 3d 92, 531 N.E.2d 773 (1988); Note,
Ohio's Child Support Guidelines: A Springboard or a Crutch?, 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 471,
491-92 (1989).
77. La. R.S. 9:315.11 (1991) ("The enactment of this Part shall not for that reason
alone be considered a change in the circumstances of either party.").
78. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-115(3)(a) (1989).
79. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10.122(i)(b) (1989) (amended 1986).
80. In re Marriage of Pugliese, 761 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
81. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-115(3)(a) and (b) (1989).
82. Id. at § 14-10-122(i)(a).
83. Id. at § 14-10-122(I)(b).
84. Id. at § 14-10-122(I)(b); Pugliese, 761 P.2d at 278.
85. In re Marriage of Miller, 790 P.2d 890, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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requiring a showing of a substantial and continuing change of circum-
stances must be considered in conjunction with the guidelines.8 6
Oregon's legislative guidelines are similar to those in Colorado and
Vermont.87 As in Colorado, the movant must prove a substantial change
in circumstances since the original award."8 A simple reapplication of
the guidelines without more would result in frequent modifications and
subvert the policy of stability, so Colorado requires a 10% difference 9
and Vermont requires a 10% difference 0 Oregon's legislation, however,
is silent on the percentage difference that will constitute a sufficient
change for modification. 9' Again, Louisiana's guidelines apply to both
initial awards and modification of child support, and they provide that
"[tihere shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child
support obtained by use of the guidelines ... is the proper
amount .. .,,"
Section 14.08 of the Texas Family Code provides authority to modify
a support order if circumstances have changed materially and substan-
tially since the entry of the order.9 The Texas child support guidelines
apparently provide a mechanism to show a material and substantial
change of circumstances. The guidelines themselves may be used to
determine whether a change of circumstances has occurred:" Apparently,
if the guidelines, applied to the circumstances of a given case, indicate
a substantially different amount, a new order will be appropriate." In
86. Id.
87. Or. Rev. Stat. 25.270-.285 (Supp. 1990 (Part I)); Note, New Mandatory Child
Support Guidelines in Oregon: A New Age of Structured Awards and Parental Account-
ability, 26 Willamette L. Rev. 1019, 1041 (1990).
88. In re Marriage of Myers and Myers, 764 P.2d 590, 591 (Or. Ct. App. 1988);
Note, supra note 87, at 1041.
89. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-122(i)(b) (1989).
90. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 660(b) (Supp. 1991) (prior to 1989 Vermont required a
1501o difference); Note, supra note 87, at 1041.
91. Or. Rev. Stat. § 25.280 (Supp. 1990 (Part I)); Note, supra note 87, at 1042.
92. La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) (1991).
93. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Ramsey, Modification
of Child Support: Making the Mother Pay, 52 Tex. B.J. 638 (1989). The guidelines are
found in Tex. Faro. Code Ann. §§ 14.052-.058 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
94. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 14.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Ramsey, supra note
93, at 640, citing Sampson & Davis, supra note 48, at 11.
95. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("The court may consider
the guidelines for the support of a child in this chapter to determine whether there has
been a material and substantial change in circumstances under section 14.08(c)(2) ....
However, an increase in the needs, standard of living, or lifestyle of the obligee since
the rendering of the existing order does not warrant an increase in the obligor's child
support obligation. If the amount of support of a child contained in the order sought
to be modified is not in substantial compliance with the guidelines, this may warrant a
modification of a prior order in accordance with the guidelines if the modification is in
the best interest of the child." (emphasis added)); see Ramsey, supra note 93, at 640,
citing Sampson & Davis, supra note 48, at II.
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December, 1990, a Texas court of appeals held that the fact that the
trial court may consider the guidelines in the Family Code did not
change the former husband's burden of proof or create elements that
established a need for modification.9 In a case where a father wanted
to reduce his child support obligation by applying the guidelines, a Texas
appellate court held that, while the guidelines create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the amount arising from their application is correct and
in the best interest of the child,97 in modification of previous orders
the use of the rebuttable presumption is discretionary, not mandatory,
as it utilizes the discretionary may.98 The fact that the court could
consider the kuidelines does not change the burden of proof or create
elements that establish the need for modification."
Alabama's guidelines provide that "[t]he provisions of any judgment
.respecting child support shall be modified . . .only upon a showing of
a material change of circumstances that is substantial and continuing.""°
Prior to the effective date of the mandatory guidelines, some Alabama
appellate courts held that proof of a material change must be made
prior to applying the guidelines; once a material change in circumstances
has occurred, the court is to apply the guidelines to determine the
appropriate amount.' 0' One appellate court even held that application
of the guidelines, which indicated that the child support paid by a
husband was substantially higher than the amount recommended under
the guidelines, did not constitute a material change in circumstances)0 2
Alabama's legislation, which is now mandatory, however, also provides
that the child support guidelines are to be applied as a "basis for
periodic updates of child support obligations ...103 [and the] faipplication
96. MacCallum v. MacCallum, 801 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), writ
denied, 810 S.W.2d 848 (1991).
97. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.055(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (the 1991 version provides
that the amount is reasonable and in the best interest of the child); MacCallum, 801
S.W.2d at 583.
98. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MacCallum, 801 S.W.2d
at 584.
99. MacCailum, 801 S.W.2d at 584.
100. Rule 32(A)(2)(i), Alabama Rules ot Judicial Administration (1991) [hereinafter
A.R.J.A.).
t01. Marchman v. Marchman, 571 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (Once a
change had been established, the guidelines were applicable by the trial judge, even though
the modification action had been filed prior to the effective date of the guidelines. This
was because the guidelines, although not mandatory prior to the effective date, were
available as guideposts to aid the trial judge in applying her or his discretion in child
support awards.).
102. Davis v. Davis, 535 So. 2d 183, 184 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (rendered prior to
the effective date of the mandatory guidelines).
103. Rule 32(A)(2), A.R.J.A. (1991) (emphasis added).
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of the child support guidelines to the circumstances of the parties at
the time of the filing of a petition for modification ... ,1, which results
in less than a ten percent change in the amount of support due per
month, shall be rebuttably presumed not to be a material change in
circumstances."'' 0° Later, in 1990, the same Alabama appellate court
which decided that a significant difference did not amount to a material
change in circumstances stated, in a dissenting opinion by Judge Russell,
that the guideline language noted above, now that it is mandatory,
should be interpreted, by negative implication, to mean that if application
of the guidelines establishes a difference of at least 10% in the amount
of child support, a material change of 'circumstances has been made
out.'06 The application of the guidelines may function as a basis for
modification.' °0 This is done by "[applying the guidelines to modify]
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the filing . . . ." When
the application of the child support guidelines to the circumstances of
the parties at the time of the filing of the petition for modification
results in less than a ten percent change in the amount of child support
due, this is not to be considered a material change in circumstances. °0
Where a trial judge held that the recipient of child support, based on
an order rendered prior to the promulgation of the mandatory guidelines,
had established a change of circumstances sufficient for a modification,
it was error not to apply the guidelines to establish the appropriate
amount or, alternatively, to not find on the record why the application
of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. 09
Louisiana law, on the other hand, provides that "(t~he enactment
[of the guidelines] shall not for that reason alone be considered a change
in the circumstances of either party. '""0 It could be argued that it is
not the "enactment" of the guidelines that establishes the change in
circumstances, but their "application." Louisiana's law, however, does
not have a clause indicating that a 10% (or other percentage) difference
will amount to a presumption of a change of circumstances, so it seem,.
difficult to accept that the legislature intended to allow their "appli-
cation" to establish a material change of circumstances.
104. Rule 32(A)(2)(ii), A.R.J.A. (1991) (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Moore v. Moore, 575 So. 2d 95, 97-98 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (dissenting opinion).
107. Rule 32(A)(2), A.R.J.A. (1991).
108. Moore, 575 So. 2d at 97, citing In re Marriage of Greenblatt, 789 P.2d 489,
491 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Miller, 790 P.2d 890, 892 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990); and In re Marriage of Pugliese, 761 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), as
decisions interpreting similar legislation in the manner suggested by the dissent in Moore.
109. Thomas v. Thomas, 575 So. 2d 583, 584 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
110. La. R.S. 9:315.11 (1991).
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Child (and Spousal) Support Enforcement'
The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 made sweeping
changes in child and spousal support enforcement. These amendments
are part of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)." '
These amendments make federal funding for welfare and other social
service benefits dependent on the states' adopting the required child
support enforcement measures." 3 The amendments make virtually all the
pertinent federal agencies available to the states for support enforcement
purposes, including: the Social Security Administration, I.R.S., armed
forces, etc. In exchange for the funding and access to these agencies
and services, the states are required to implement several coordinating
and enforcement mechanisms and even to provide certain substantive
rules, for example, to allow an illegitimate child to have until her or
his 18th birthday to prove paternity.
The states must set up parent locator services and state agencies to
assist child support enforcement. The state agencies must be made avail-
able to muster information on missing spouses/parents." 4 The states
must establish "expedited processes" for support enforcement. Major
measures that Louisiana has interstitially and with varying degrees of
specificity undertaken, pursuant to its quid pro quo, include expedited
processes for establishment and enforcement of support;"' automatic
data processing for purposes of child support enforcement;" 6 authori-
zation for Louisiana courts to impose liens to ensure payment of child
support;" 7 authorization for Louisiana courts to require absent parents
to provide security;" 8 approval of the interception of income tax re-
funds;" 9 and mandatory income withholding. 20 With regard to income
withholding, the employer is liable to the state for any amount he or
she fails to withhold. An employer may be fined (the state must have
I11. See the U.S. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984), 42 U.S.C. § 601, 652, et seq. (1984 and Supp. 1991) and
related statutes; Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 667 (Supp. 1991). These amend-
ments are implemented in Family and Child Support Programs, La. R.S. 46:236.1 (1982
and Supp. 1991).
112. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 735 (2d ed. 1988).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. La. R.S. 46:236.1; 46:236.5 (Supp. 1992).
116. See, La. R.S. 46:236.1, 46:236.6(F); see also La. R.S. 13:1641 et seq., La. R.S.
13:1671 and 13:1693.
117. See, La. R.S. 46:236.1(F); State v. Stringer, 567 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1990); see also La. R.S. 46:236.3 and 23:1693.
118. La. R.S. 46:236.3(E)(1). 46:236.6(D), and 13:1696(C).
119. La. R.S. 46:236.1(1).
120. La. R.S. 46:236.3 (1982 and Supp. 1991), Enforcement of Support by Income
Assignment. La. R.S. 46:236.4 (Supp. 1991), Interstate Enforcement of Support by Income
Assignment. La. R.S. 46:236.5 (Supp. 1991), Expedited Process for the Establishment and
Enforcement of Support. See also, La. R.S. 23:731.
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a means to fine the employer). Louisiana has had to provide sanctions
against employers who take any disciplinary action against or who
discharge any such employee, due to the burdens of the process.,
New Cause of Action to Prove Paternity
Unless it is not in the best interest of the child, the Department of
Health and Human Resources may take direct civil action, including
actions to establish filiation, against an alleged biological parent, and
notwithstanding the existence of a legal presumption that another person
is the parent of the child, solely for the purpose of fulfilling its re-
sponsibility under this section. This may be done in any court of
competent jurisdiction and without the necessity of written assignment,
subrogation, tutorship proceedings, or divorce proceedings in any case
in which an AFDC grant has been made for or on behalf of a child,
or in any case in which the department has agreed to provide services
for a non-AFDC applicant. This statute creates a distinct and separate
cause of action in favor of the department, and suits under this section
need not be ancillary to or dependent on any other proceeding.' 22
Child Support Enforcement-Other Means
Criminal Neglect
The Louisiana Criminal Code provides criminal sanctions for parents
who do not support their children. This charge encompasses "intentional
non-support" by a parent if his or her minor child is in "destitute or
necessitous circumstances.' 2' The Louisiana Supreme Court has held
that the application of the presumption of paternity in Civil Code articles
184-186 to establish filiation for purposes of criminal neglect "clearly
violates the federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process." ' 14
When a legally presumed father utilized blood testing to prove that he
could not have been the father, he was held not guilty of criminal
neglect and not responsible to pay child support. He, also, was given
credit for support paid for this child from the original in globo support
order that had been made pursuant to the presumption of paternity,
even though the father had obtained the blood test results subsequent
121. La. R.S. 46:236.3 (1982 and Supp. 1991).
122. La. R.S. 46:236.1 (1982 and Supp. 1991); see also Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d
847 (La. 1989).
123. La. R.S. 14:74(A)(1)(b) (1982); State v. Veal, 579 So. 2d 486, 487 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1991).
124. State v. Prosper, 580 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 580
So. 2d 84 (1991) (relying on State v. Cornell Jones, 481 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1986)).
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to the running of the Louisiana Civil Code article 189 prescriptive
period.' 23
Contempt
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)
provides that the duty to support is enforceable by a proceeding for
civil contempt. 126 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611 is Louisiana's gen-
eral contempt statute. Contempt is defined as: "Wilful disobedience of
any lawful judgment ... wilful disobedience means an act or failure
to act that is done intentionally, knowingly and purposefully, without
justifiable excuse."'2 7 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611, entitled Pun-
ishment for Contempt of Court, provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided for by law: (1) The supreme court,
the courts of appeal, the district courts, family courts, juvenile
courts and the city courts may punish a person adjudged guilty
of a contempt of court therein ... [flor ... disobeying an
order for the payment of child support or alimony or an order
for the right of visitation, by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than three months,
or both .... 128
Contempt procedure in civil cases is regulated by Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure articles 221-227 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 227 provides that the pun-
ishment which a court may impose on a person adjudged guilty of
contempt of court is provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611
and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 224(2).1'9 A trial court
is vested with great discretion to determine whether a party should be
held in contempt for willful disobedience of a trial court judgment.3 0
Right to Counsel
There is a variety of judicial opinion as to whether a defendant
may have a right to counsel at the time he consents to a court support
125. Id.
126. La. R.S. 13:1663 (1982) and La. R.S. 13:1680 (1982). The Children's Code,
discussed infra, has its own contempt mechanism.
127. Kirby v. Kirby, 579 So. 2d 508, 519 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 582 So.
2d 1308 (1991).
128. La. R.S. 13:4611(1)(d) (1991).
129. La. Code Civ. P. art. 224(2); Kirby, 579 So. 2d at 519.
130. Id. at 519.
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order under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:75-75.2.'1' The fourth circuit
held that it is not necessary to appoint counsel in a Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:75.2 situation where the defendant and the district attorney
agree to a stipulation of support."' This aspect of "criminal neglect"
for the fourth circuit is apparently "quasi-civil" in nature and does not
require such constitutional protection, although violation of this order
can result in the defendant being found to be in contempt of court and
sentenced to not more than six months in prison.' 33 Some provisions of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:74-75.2 are "necessarily criminal in na-
ture, "'34 insofar as a violation of a support order will give rise to
possible fine or imprisonment for punishment. Contempt proceedings
have been held to be prosecutorial in nature.'"
Contempt generally is considered "civil" when the court uses it to
"encourage" the obligor to pay and "criminal" when designed to sanc-
tion the spouse who willfully disobeys a court order. Notwithstanding
the ventured distinction between civil and criminal contempt, it would
seem that any power to incarcerate for "vindication of the dignity of
the court" or to coerce payment is at least quasi-criminal in nature,
triggering a due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to
be heard. 3' Imprisonment for such contempt is not considered to violate
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, because
support is considered to be an obligation imposed by law pursuant to
the marriage, its dissolution, or the parent-child relation.
The second circuit recently held that a "defendant who is brought
to trial upon a petition for support filed by the State pursuant to
[Louisiana Revised Statutes) 46:236.1 must be advised of his right to
counsel ... because the judgment rendered against the defendant wherein
he was uncounseled was used as a basis to punish him for contempt
under R.S. 46:236.7."' 31 The right to counsel existed, even though the
131. See, e.g., State v. St. Pierre, 515 So. 2d 769 (La. 1987); State v. Broussard, 490
So. 2d 273 (La. 1986).
132. State v. Veal, 579 So. 2d 486, 487 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 582 So. 2d
1308 (1991).
133. Id. at 487.
134. Id.
135. State v. St. Pierre, 515 So. 2d 769 (La. 1987); Veal, 579 So. 2d at 487.
136. See Caughron v. Caughron, 579 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (a
continuance should have been allowed to give defendant in a civil action time to obtain
counsel to represent him in contempt hearing); Martin v. Martin, 457 So. 2d 189. 193
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); C. Blakesley, Chapter 32, Alimony and Spousal Support, in
Wardle, Blakesley & Parker, Contemporary Family Law, supra note *, at 68-69.
137. State v. St. Pierre, 515 So. 2d 769 (La. 1987); State v. Creamer, 528 So. 2d
667, 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (relying on State v. Broussard, 490 So. 2d 273 (La.
1986)); and State v. Scott, 508 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 519 So. 2d 104 (La. 1988).
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state did not proceed pursuant to the criminal neglect statutes. The
Department of Health and Human Resources is authorized to enforce
child support orders even for people not receiving AFDC benefits.'
The penalties for contempt under Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:236 are
the same as those pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:74 and
14:75, possible prison for not more than six months, subject to sus-
pension and probation. Although it is true that no imprisonment is
possible under this scheme, nevertheless, when the defendant enters a
support stipulation under Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:75.2, the right
to counsel ought to attach because the proceedings are prosecutorial in
nature and because subsequent violation of the support stipulation serves
as a basis to punish the defendant for contempt under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 46:236.7. The manner in which the district attorney proceeds
and the potential penalty are indistinguishable from those used in criminal
neglect. Thus, the right to counsel should obtain.'
An argument against the right to counsel in child support contempt
cases has been made recently in a dissent from a decision of the Louisiana
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The dissent argued that in a civil,
rather than criminal, proceeding a person is "not constitutionally entitled
to a lawyer"; failure to provide an attorney "is not per se reversible
error." In the dissent's view, "public policy dictates that the enforcement
of the defendant's obligation bears penal consequences and remains a
purely civil proceeding, without triggering the constitutional safeguards
provided to a criminal defendant. Appointment of counsel at civil support
enforcement proceedings would serve only to frustrate public policy."'"
Contempt has recently been held not appropriate for failure to pay
child support pursuant to a consent agreement arising out of a criminal
neglect proceeding that was fifteen years old, for which the transcript
had been lost or destroyed, and for which there was no evidence that
the defendant had been read his rights, including his right to counsel.'14
Interstate Enforcement: The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA)
The mechanism for enforcing child support, when more than one
state is involved, is based on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA). '12 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1641 provides
138. La. R.S. 46:236.1(B)(2) (Supp. 1991).
139. Creamer, 528 So. 2d at 669.
140. Caughron, 579 So. 2d at 1216-17 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
141. State v. Thomas, 579 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 586
So. 2d 535 (1991).
142. La. R.S. 13:1641 et seq. (1983 and Supp. 1991).
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that, "The purposes of this Part are to improve and extend by reciprocal
legislation the enforcement of duties of support."' 43 URESA is available
to enforce either child or spousal support awards. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:1642 reads: "Duty of support means a duty of support
whether imposed or imposable by law or by order, decree, or judgment
of any court, whether interlocutory or final or whether incidental to an
action for divorce ... and includes the duty to pay arrearages of support
past due and unpaid."' 1 A support order is defined therein as a judgment
in favor of an obligee and an obligee is a "person to whom a duty of
support is owed."' 4 5 The law provides that jurisdiction for any proceeding
under URESA is vested in the juvenile court.'" A parent may sue the
other parent of a child for child support or a spouse or ex-spouse may
sue his or her spouse or ex-spouse for alimony, pendente lite, or per-
manent, as the case may be. 14
Also, of course, any person with custody of a minor may sue for
his or her support.'" The Uniform Enforcement of Support Act has
been held constitutional in Louisiana, like in other states. 49
Child Support Arrearages
In Lavergne v. Lavergne, the third circuit held the movant in an
action to make past-due child support executory has the burden of
proving the amount of child support in arrears." 0 The paying spouse
is not entitled to credit for overpayments made without proving an
agreement with the recipient ex-spouse to allow him to credit those
overpayments against any future support obligation. The paying spouse
had testified that he paid the extra amount because he was asked to
do so by his ex-wife, and he obliged simply because he wanted to help.
A specific agreement to allow credit for overpayment is required."'
Retroactivity of Child Support Awards
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:310 provides that child support orders
and alimony awards are to be retroactive to the date the action was
143. La. R.S. 13:1641 (1983).
144. La. R.S. 13:1642 (1983) (emphasis added).
145. La. R.S. 13:1642(g) and (o) (1983). See Bonvillian v. Bonvillian, 573 So. 2d 1161,
1163 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 31 (1991).
146. La. R.S. 13:1664 (1983).
147. See La. R.S. 13:1663, 9:291, and 9:571, all of which allow suits for support.
148. La. R.S. 13:1667 (1983); R. Pascal & K. Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course,
602 (4th ed. 1986).
149. Bonvillian, 573 So. 2d at 1163.
150. 556 So. 2d 918, 919 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
151. Id. at 920.
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filed, unless the court finds good cause for not making the award
retroactive."a Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:399 provides similarly for
child support related to paternity actions."'
CHILDREN'S CODES4
Jurisdiction in Family Law Related Matters
Children's Code article 307 provides that a court exercising juvenile
jurisdiction shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over adult parties
in the following cases involving the care, custody, or control of a child:
(1) child in need of care proceedings pursuant to Title VI of the Code;
(2) families in need of services proceedings pursuant to Title VII; (3)
involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant to Title
X; (4) voluntary termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant to
Title XI; (5) adoption proceedings pursuant to Title XII; and (6) special
proceedings, such as parental transfer of custody proceedings pursuant
to Title XV. The Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:211-214 relating to mar-
riage of minors were repealed and enacted verbatim as Children's Code
articles 1543-1550. Many of the issues covered by the Civil Code or the
Louisiana Revised Statutes relating to children and their relationship
with parents or others are covered in the Children's Code, creating
possible difficulties in coordination and coherency.
A major problem that arises from the promulgation and language
of the Children's Code is the Children's Code's correlation with and
impact on substantive family law. Although it can be argued, and the
rapporteur has indicated, that the Children's Code applies only to ju-
152. La. R.S. 9:310 (1991); e.g., Watson v. Hampton, 569 So. 2d 635, 636 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1990) (affirming a trial judge's decision that good cause supported the decision
not to make a child support award retroactive to the date of the filing of the paternity
and child support action; trial was delayed for over a year because of scheduling conflicts
involving plaintiff's counsel).
153. La. R.S. 9:399 (1991) (where the trial judge finds good cause not to make the
award retroactive to the filing of the action, he or she may make it "retroactive to a
date subsequent to the filing of the paternity suit, but in no event shall the award be
fixed later than the date of the rendition of the paternity judgment."); see, e.g., Watson,
569 So. 2d at 636.
154. Act 235 of the Regular Session 1991 enacted the Children's Code. Certain titles
of the Children's Code impact on or amend matters relating to family law. For example,
La. R.S. 9:211, 212, 213, 214 (relating to marriage of minors); 9:401, 402, 403, 404, 405,
406, 407, 421, 422, 422.1, 422.2, 422.3, 422.4, 422.5, 422.6, 422.7, 422.8, 422.9, 422.10,
422.11, 422.12, 422.13, 422.14, 422.15, 423, 424, 424.1, 424.2, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429,
430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 440.1, 441 (relating to "voluntary
surrender of a child," "abandonment of children," and adoption) were repealed and
articles of the Children's Code were promulgated to cover these subjects. This article will
cover the changes and refer to the Children's Code in the relevant subject matter sections.
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venile court proceedings, the language in the Code does not clearly so
provide. Thus, a potential conflict of substantive law arises in matters
of custody, marriage of minors, tutorship, as well as other areas.
Children's Code article 103 provides: "Except as otherwise specified
in any Title of this Code, the provisions of the Children's Code shall
be applicable in all juvenile court proceedings.""' Immediately, in the
definitional section, conflict and incoherence with the Civil Code and
the relevant titles of the Revised Statutes begins. For example, Children's
Code article 116(6) defines "[gluardian of the person of the child" to
mean:
the duty and authority to make important decisions in matters
having a permanent effect on the life and development of the
child and the responsibility for the child's general welfare until
he reaches the age of majority, subject to any residual rights
possessed by the child's parents. It shall include but not nec-
essarily be limited to: (a) The authority to consent to marriage,
to enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, to rep-
resent the minor in legal actions, to make other decisions of
substantial legal significance concerning the minor. (b) The au-
thority and duty of reasonable visitation, except to the extent
that such right of visitation has been limited by court order.
(c) The rights and responsibilities of legal custody."16
These are rights and obligations pertaining to custody, tutorship, and
visitation, which are governed by extant Civil Code articles. The intention
was not to encroach upon the substantive Civil Code provisions, but
the language does not clearly so indicate.
A similar problem relates to Article 116(12), which provides: "Legal
custody means the right to have physical custody of the child and to
determine where and with whom the child shall reside; to exercise the
rights and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child; the authority
to consent to major medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment; and
to provide the child with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical
care, all subject to any residual rights possessed by the child's parents."' 57
This could be interpreted to have appropriated all matters of child
custody or even to have abrogated Civil Code articles 131-134, including
joint custody and all the substantive provisions appertaining thereto.
Similarly, Article 116(28) provides: "Tutor means one other than a
parent who has qualified for the office and has been confirmed or
155. La. Ch.C. art. 103 (emphasis added).
156. La. Ch.C. art. 116(6) (emphasis added). This particular provision is discussed
more in detail, infra.
157. La. Ch.C. art. 116(12) (emphasis added).
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appointed by a court.""' Could this be'read to mean that all the law
relating to natural tutors has been abrogated? The Children's Code
presents a serious problem of correlation, if not more, with Louisiana
substantive family law. This is substantive law applying to subjects which
have always been prescribed by the Civil Code or its ancillaries. The
language of Children's Code article 103 could be read to appropriate
significant portions of the Civil Code.'59
These untoward possibilities apparently were not intended by the
drafters, but the language is broad enough to be so interpreted; the
Children's Code was not designed or intended to create this potential
havoc. 60 Nevertheless, some of the language, without gloss and devel-
opment might lead an unknowing judge to believe otherwise. This sym-
posium piece is not intended to provide a comprehensive critique of the
Children's Code or to provide a complete iteration of these problems
of correlation between the Children's Code and the rest of the civil
law, but simply to indicate some potential problems and to suggest that
those interested in clarifying the law focus on an amelioration of the
potential problem of overlapping codes. Jurists need to look carefully
at the purpose of the Children's Code and its intended correlation with
the rest of Louisiana family law.
UCCJA
Children's Code article 310 provides: Unless declined, a court ex-
ercising juvenile court jurisdiction shall have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over cases subject to the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1701-1724, when
any of the following circumstances occur: (I) a claim of emergency
jurisdiction is made pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1702(3);
(2) a petition alleges that a child is in need of care as defined by Title
V1, of the Children's Code; and (3) a petition otherwise alleges facts
that would bring the proceedings within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the juvenile courts pursuant to the Children's Code. The district
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all other claims of
jurisdiction under the UCCJA and claims of emergency jurisdiction when
declined by the juvenile court. 61 Thus, we have a potentially confusing
situation, where the-district court will have jurisdiction when the juris-
diction hinges on home state, significant connection and substantial
evidence, but the juvenile court will have jurisdiction when the above-
noted indications obtain.
158. La. Ch.C. art. 116(28) (emphasis added).
159. See La. Ch.C. art. 116(4).
160. Personal discussion with Professor Lucy McGough, rapporteur.
161. La. Ch.C. art. 310.
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Support of the Family
Children's Code article 311 provides for exclusive juvenile court
jurisdiction over matters relating to the support of the family in the
following cases: (1) proceedings involving desertion, nonsupport, or crim-
inal neglect of a child by either parent, or by one spouse of the other
spouse; (2) proceedings under URESA; (3) proceedings brought by the
Department of Social Services on its own behalf or on behalf of any
person for whom support has been ordered to enforce support by
interstate income assignment pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes
46:236.4; or (4) proceedings brought by the district attorney to establish
or enforce support pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 46:236.2 or Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:236.1(F). A support
order brought under Article 311 shall not modify a prior judgment of
a district court or be modified by a district court having appropriate
jurisdiction over support.162
Special Proceedings
The purpose of the title in the Children's Code on Special Pro-
ceedings is to provide the substantive and procedural guidelines governing
the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over contempt proceedings,
voluntary transfer of custody proceedings, proceedings seeking judicial
authorization for minors' marriages, declaratory judgment proceedings
involving medical treatment for terminally ill children, and domestic
abuse assistance proceedings. 163 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:211-214,
relating to marriage of minors, were repealed and enacted verbatim as
Children's Code articles 1543-1550.
Voluntary Transfer of Custody
The code states that its purpose:
is to protect the health and welfare of children by providing,
in addition to any other provisions of law, for juvenile court
procedure to govern a voluntary transfer of custody of a child
by parents to other responsible adults for the purpose of enabling
the child to receive adequate care and treatment. The provisions
of this Chapter are intended to promote mutual understanding
of the rights and responsibilities of the parents and custodians
and of any terms or conditions which may be set forth by
agreement of the parties.'"
162. La. Ch.C. art. 311.
163. La. Ch.C. art. 1501. Special Proceedings are presented in Title XV.
164. La. Ch.C. art. 1510.
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This chapter of the Children's Code establishes a new institution
called "guardianship of the person of the child." Apparently there are
three institutions: parental authority, tutorship, and, now, guardianship
of the person of the child. The latter is designed, apparently, for those
instances when a child is removed from parents or when parents vol-
untarily give the child up to the custody of another, but no tutorship
is established. There appear to be questions as to how this chapter dove-
tails with parental authority and tutorship. It seems that the chapter,
Guardianship of the Person of the Child, was adopted to comply with
the Federal Permanency Planning Law, 65 which calls for continuing
judicial oversight of children in foster programs. Thus, for example, a
child who has been placed in the custody of her mother after a divorce
would be under the mother's natural tutorship. If the mother agreed
to have the child placed into foster care, the child would be legally
placed under the regime of guardianship of the child. On its own motion
or on the motion of any party, the court may order a hearing to review
the transfer of custody. Judgments transferring custody pursuant to this
chapter are exempt from the permanency planning requirements man-
dated in Title VI of the Children's Code.'"
Guardianship of the person of the child is defined in Article 1511(1)
as "the duty and authority to make important decisions in matters
having a permanent effect on the life and development of the minor
and to be concerned about his general welfare." The institution seems
to have the same authority and responsibility as that of tutorship, but
query whether the guardian is liable under Article 2318. Article 1511
continues:
It shall include but shall not necessarily be limited in either
number or kind to: (a) The authority to consent to marriage,
to enlistment in the armed forces . . ., or to major medical,
psychiatric, and surgical treatment, to represent the minor in
legal actions, to make other decisions of substantial legal sig-
nificance concerning the minor. (b) The authority and duty of
reasonable visitation, except to the extent that such right of
visitation has been limited by court order. (c) The rights and
responsibilities of legal custody, including the right to have
physical custody of the child and to exercise the rights and duty
to protect, train, and discipline him and to provide him with
food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care, all subject
to any residual rights possessed by the child's parents.'67
165. Pub. L. No. 96-272; 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
166. La. Ch.C. art. 1521 (Review and Permanency Planning).
167. La. Ch.C. art. 1511(l).
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"Legal custody," is defined in Article 1511(2) as "a legal status created
by court order which vests in a custodian the right to have physical
custody of the child and the right and duty to protect, train, and
discipline him and to provide him with food, shelter, education, and
ordinary medical care, all subject to the powers, rights, and duties and
responsibilities of the guardian of the person of the child and subject
to any residual parental rights and responsibilities."'" "Physical cus-
tody" is defined in Article 1511(3) as the "duty and authority to provide
care for a child in the home of the custodian." '9
How Does This Comport With Parental Authority and Tutorship?
Is guardianship of the person of the child the legal institution that
arises when a court awards custody and fails to establish tutorship?
What about the institution of the "natural tutor," which arises as a
matter of right to the custodial parent after a divorce? Is the natural
tutor removed and replaced by a "guardian. of the person of the child?"
Does the latter have to qualify as tutor? It looks like this institution
relates only to those instances in which parents or tutors make a vol-
untary and knowing transfer of custody. A voluntary transfer of custody
is "the knowing and voluntary relinquishment of legal custody or guard-
ianship to an agency, institution, or individual, subject to residual pa-
rental rights retained by the parent under such terms and conditions
that enable the child to receive adequate care and treatment."' 70 The
juvenile court in the parish in which either the parents requesting transfer
of custody reside, or in which the person, agency, or institution to
whom the transfer of custody is intended resides has jurisdiction.' The
petition for voluntary transfer of custody is provided for in Article
1514, which indicates that the action to transfer custody commences
with the filing of a written petition. Also, all persons or organizations
lawfully exercising legal custody shall join the petition, unless a legal
custodian is unable or unwilling to join in, and in that case the petition
shall state with particularity the reasons therefore.
The contents and form of the petition are presented in Article 1515.
The petition shall contain: (I) the name and address of all parents and
legal custodians; (2) an affirmation that the parents are knowingly and
voluntarily transferring custody; (3) the full name and date of birth of
the child whose custody is sought to be transferred; (4) the factual basis
for the transfer of custody; (5) the nature, duration, and extent of the
transfer of custody, including any terms and conditions; and (6) the
168. La. Ch.C. art. 1511(2).
169. La. Ch.C. art. 1511(3).
170. La. Ch.C. art. 1511(4).
171. La. Ch.C. art. 1513.
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name and address of the agency, institution, or individual to whom the
child is sought to be transferred and the relationship, if any, to the
child.'"7 A form for the petition is also provided. Notice of the transfer
of custody proceeding shall be served on any parent or legal custodian
who has not joined in the petition. Notice may be served by personal
or domiciliary service or by certified mail, proof of which shall be filed
in the record. If a parent or legal custodian cannot be served, the court
may appoint an attorney as curator for him, and service shall be made
upon the curator. If a curator is not appointed, the court shall specifically
reserve the absentee's rights in any order transferring custody.'73 There
shall be a hearing on the record, unless specifically waived by the court.
The court shall render a written judgment granting or denying the
transfer of custody. 174
If the court grants the transfer of custody, it must indicate that:
(1) all the necessary parties were involved; (2) the transfer was knowing
and voluntary; (3) there is a legitimate purpose and a factual basis to
support that purpose; (4) all parties have been advised of and understand
the nature and extent of the transfer, including any terms and conditions,
and of their respective rights; and (5) the proposed change of custody
is in the best interest of the child. The court then shall order the transfer
of custody and recite such terms and conditions as requested by the
parties.' As noted above, the authority of the person(s) awarded custody
of the person of the child in this manner is essentially the same as the
authority of a parent pursuant to parental authority or tutorship. Does
the new "guardian of the person of the child" become tutor or have
to meet the requirements and protections pertaining to tutorship? The
Children's Code does not seem to answer this question.
Modification
Except when the parties jointly desire to dismiss the proceedings
and return custody of the child to the parents, modification or enforce-
ment of a judgment transferring custody shall be upon motion of any
-party and by order of the court according to the provisions of the
chapter. If the parties desire to dismiss the proceedings and return the
child to the parents, the court is to be notified and the court shall
render an ex parte dismissal of the proceedings.7 6 This raises questions
relating to whether tutorship will be restored. Will the tutor have to be
confirmed or qualified again? Similarly, relating to revocation, if a
172. La. Ch.C. art. 1515.
173. La. Ch.C. art. 1517.
174. La. Ch.C. arts. 1519 and 1520 (Hearing and Judgment).
175. La. Ch.C. art. 1520.
176. La. Ch.C. art. 1522.
[Vol. 52
LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW
parent or tutor revokes his or her consent and the custodian refuses to
return the child, the parent may move for dismissal of the proceedings
and for the return of the child to his or her custody. There will then
be a contradictory hearing with the parents or tutor and the custodian. "
Contempt in the New Children's Code
The juvenile courts have the power to enforce their orders by con-
tempt of court.7 8 The Code spells out the kinds of contempt, direct
and constructive, and provides the measures that may be taken to
"punish" those found to be in contempt.179 Constructive contempt is
most relevant. Article 1507 provides that constructive contempt includes,
"Willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or
process of the court."' 80
CHILD CUSTODY
The New Children's Code and Custody
Children's Code article 309 provides:
A. Except as provided in Article 313 [relating to the duration
of jurisdiction over proceedings], a court exercising juvenile
jurisdiction shall have continuing jurisdiction over the following
proceedings and the exclusive authority to modify any custody
determination rendered, including the consideration of visitation
rights: (1) Child in need of care proceedings pursuant to Title
VI. (2) Families in need of services proceedings pursuant to Title
VII. (3) Involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings
pursuant to Title X. (4) Voluntary termination of parental rights
proceedings pursuant to Title XI. (5) Adoption proceedings pur-
suant to Title XII. (6) Parental transfer of custody proceedings
pursuant to Title XV.
B. In exercise of its jurisdiction to determine the custody
of a child under writs of habeas corpus or when custody is
incidental to the determination of pending cases, a district court
may enter an order of custody or modify any prior order of
custody rendered by a juvenile court concerning the same child
in any proceeding except those enumerated in [Article 309(A)].' 1
177. La. Ch.C. art. 1523 (Revocation).
178. La. Ch.C. art. 319; La. Ch.C. arts. 1503-1509.
179. La. Ch.C. arts. 1504-1508.
180. La. Ch.C. art. 1507.
181. La. Ch.C. art. 309 (emphasis added).
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Custody & Divorce
Louisiana Civil Code article 157 was amended in 1990 to comport
with the elimination of separation from bed and board as a step in
divorce proceedings, and was redesignated as Article 134.112 Article 134
directs that "[in all cases of divorce, and change of custody after an
original award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be
granted to the parents in accordance with article 131 [old article 146]."' '
Physical custody and legal custody of a child are related, but distinct
propositions. Thus, a parent may have equal authority, privileges and
responsibilities for a child, pursuant to Civil Code articles 131 and 250,
without having equal physical care and control.'"
The test to be applied in all child custody determinations is the
extremely vague best interest of the child standard, as jurisprudentially
mandated at least since 1921 and legislatively mandated since 1979.
Every child custody case must be viewed within its own peculiar set of
facts with the paramount goal being the best interest of the child.,8 5
The trial court's decision as to what is in the best interest of the child
in custody cases is to be given great weight and will be reversed only
where there is a clear abuse of discretion. 6 Louisiana's "Best Interest
Test" is given content by the order of preference in child custody: 1)
joint custody in parents; 2) sole custody to parent; and 3) custody to
a third person, if it is proved that parental custody will result in
substantial harm to the child and if it would be in the best interest of
the child to be with the non-parent.'87 More content is provided by the
factors to be considered: "In making an order for custody to either
parent, the court shall consider, among other factors, which parent is
more likely to allow the child or children frequent and continuing contact
with the noncustodial parent, and shall not prefer a parent as custodian
because of that parent's race or sex."' 8 There is also a built in pre-
sumption that the child's interests are best served by placing custody in
a parent rather than a third party. Civil Code article 131(B) provides:
"Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or
182. 1990 La. Acts No. 361, § I, 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, §§ 8 and 10, both effective
January 1, 1991.
183. La. Civ. Code art. 134 (emphasis added). La. Civ. Code art. 131 (effective
January 1, 1991) is old La. Civ. Code art. 146.
184. Favaloro v. Cooper, 562 So. 2d 943, 945 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
185. La. Civ. Code art. 131; Cooper v. Cooper, 579 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991).
186. Thompson v. Thompson, 532 So. 2d 101 (La. 1988); Everett v. Everett, 433 So.
2d 705 (La. 1983); Schloegel v. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d 344, 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
187. La. Civ. Code art. 131(A)(1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively; see Spaht, supra
note 24.
188. La. Civ. Code art. 131(A)(2).
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persons other than a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall
make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detri-
mental to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve
the best interest of the child."'8 9
Joint custody is not always in the best interest of the child, for
example, where the parents are seriously antagonistic to each other,
creating a harmful, continuing volatile atmosphere.' 9 The burden of
proof that joint custody would not be in the child's best interest rests
with the parent requesting sole custody.' 9' It has been held that when
one of the parties to a joint custody plan has moved out of town and
the children are approaching school age, 50/50 sharing becomes un-
workable.' 2 Also, a mother's impending marriage and consequent re-
moval from the state, especially in conjunction with the parents' inability
to communicate or to put aside their differences for the child, obligate
the trial court to determine which parent ought to be sole custodian. 19
The presumption that joint custody is best for the child ends when one
parent moves out of state.'" The presumption provides the court with
a first choice, which must be rejected in the face of evidence which
tends to disprove the conclusion. In such a case, it becomes necessary
for the other party to reestablish the propriety of the presumption's
conclusion. 95
When a Choice Between Parents Must Be Made
If joint custody is not possible, the next option is to choose between
the two parents.' 96 First, the choice is to go to the parent who will
provide the other parent with the most access to the child.'9 Louisiana
legislation attempts to elucidate on the notion of the best interest of
the child by providing a list of factors to be considered. Stability of
the child's environment is a factor.'" "A change from a stable envi-
189. La. Civ. Code art. 131(B).
190. Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984); Waits v. Waits, 556 So. 2d 215,
219 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
191. La. Civ. Code art. 131(A)(2).
192. Carroll v. Carroll, 577 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991); Waits, 556
So. 2d at 219.
193. Edwards v. Edwards, 556 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
194. Id. at 213, citing old La. Civ. Code art. 146(K), now La. Civ. Code art. 131(K);
Myers v. Myers, 561 So. 2d 875, 878 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
195. Linder v. Linder, 569 So. 2d 173, 175-76 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
196. Waits v. Waits, 556 So. 2d 215, 219 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Edwards v.
Edwards, 556 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
197. La. Civ. Code art. 131(A)(2).
198. E.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 577 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); Cooper
v. Cooper, 579 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Bailey v. Bailey, 527 So. 2d
1030, 1032 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 528 So. 2d 565 (1988).
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ronment should not be made absent a compelling reason."' 199 The length
of time the child has been with the domiciliary parent is an important
factor in this regard, 2 " as there must be a compelling reason to uproot
a child from a stable environment.2"' This recognizes the value of the
primary caretaker approach, an example of the "psychological parent"
vision of the "best interest of the child," °2" which was adopted as an
actual presumption by the West Virginia and Minnesota Supreme Courts. 203
It is aimed at promoting certainty, stability, and predictable results'0
4
and has been promoted as a "bright line" standard for child custody
cases and as a means to reduce litigation. 205 The primary caretaker
preference, however, runs head on into the equally compelling need to
allow trial court discretion to consider freely the "variations in each
family situation." 2 " Thus, only these two states have adopted the full-
blown presumption. Most states, like Louisiana, have instead adopted
the rule that the "primary caretaker" notion functions only as one of
many factors to consider in determining child custody.? The proponents
of the presumption argue that it is a precise standard necessary to
replace the broad, vague, best interest standard.2 "8 On the other hand,
it is not clear that the notion of "primary caretaker" is much more
precise than that of the "best interest" test.3
199. Rogers, 577 So. 2d at 763.
200. Id. at 763; Bailey, 527 So. 2d at 1033.
201. Rogers, 577 So. 2d at 764.
202. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. Solnit & S. Goldstein, In the Best Interest of the
Child 66-67 (1986) (heralding the primary caretaker preference); cited and discussed in
Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody
Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 427, 440-42 (1990); see also Charlow, Awarding
Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
267, 274-75 (1987); O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary
Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D.L. Rev. 481, 484-85, 511-17 (1987) (the notion of "bond-
ing" is primary to the rule).
203. Garska v. McKoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); Pikula v. Pikula, 374
N.W.2d 705, 713-14 (Minn. 1985).
204. Crippen, supra note 202; O'Kelly, supra note 202, at 486-89 (detailing the reasons
for the rule).
205. Crippen, supra note 202, at 429.
206. Id. at 429.
207. The Minnesota Legislature abrogated the preference in Act of May 3, 1990, ch.
574, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 2131 (codified at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.17 (West 1990
and Supp. 1992) (noting that "[tlhe primary caretaker factor may not be used as a
presumption in determining the best interests of the child."), cited and discussed in Crippen,
supra note 202, at 428-29, 438-39. See also Marriage of Derby, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (Or.
Ct. App.) (primary caretaker recognized, but without a presumption or preference), mod-
ified on other grounds, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977).
208. See authority cited and discussed in Crippen, supra note 202, at 442-50.
209. Id. at 460-61.
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Considering the primary caretaker as a factor probably does enhance
the ability of the court to determine what will be in the best interest
of the child. The comments to the 1989 legislative proposal by the
Louisiana Law Institute provided a list of factors that would have assisted
the court in determining which parent has been the primary caretaker.
The list of "primary caretaker factors" may still be helpful to practi-
tioners arguing the custody issue. The factors considered in identifying
the primary caretaker include, the parent who primarily: (1) prepared
and planned the child's meals; (2) bathed, groomed and dressed the
child; (3) purchased, cleaned and cared for the child's clothes; (4)
obtained and provided medical care, including nursing and trips to
physicians; (5) arranged for social interaction among the child's peers
after school; (6) arranged alternative care; (7) put the child to bed at
night and awakened the child in the morning; (8) disciplined the child,
including teaching manners and toilet training; (9) obtained and provided
education (religious, social, cultural); and (10) taught elementary skills.',
On the other hand, the factors delineating how to determine who the
primary caretaker is may not really be suitable in determining what is
best for the child."' Does "bonding" really equate with the volume of
time spent with the child?212 What is bonding, anyway? When and how
do parents and children bond? Does a child bond with more than one
person? The primary caretaker approach has the tendency, as the paternal
and maternal preference rules, to become a shibboleth, allowing the
court to avoid analysis. These questions apparently caused an increase
in child custody litigation in Minnesota, where the approach was even-
tually abrogated by the legislature."'
I Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed the primary
caretaker presumption, stating: "This court has repeatedly held that
custody of children of tender years should be awarded to the primary
caretaker of those children. 2 14 "[T]he primary caretaker is that natural
or adoptive parent who, until the initiation of the divorce proceedings,
has been primarily responsible, for the care and nurturing of the child." '2"
210. Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); O'Hanlon & Workman, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child:
The Primary Caretaker Doctrine in West Virginia, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 355 (1990); Neely,
The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev.. 168 (1984).
211. Crippen, supra note 202, at 460-61.
212. Id. at 460-61 nn.120-21 and accompanying text; citing Elster, Solomonic Judg-
ments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1987); and
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 226, 284 (Summer 1975).
213. Crippen, supra note 202, at 461.
214. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d at 602.
215. Id., citing Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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"Once a determination of primary caretaker has been established, a
presumption in favor of the primary caretaker attaches, and that party
is entitled to custody absent a showing that he or she is unfit .... ,,216
If the court is unable to determine that one of the two parents was
clearly the primary caretaker, neither one will have the advantage of
the presumption.217
Rejection of the Primary Caretaker Presumption
The Minnesota legislature has abrogated the Minnesota Supreme
Court's adoption of the primary caretaker presumption. 18 All other
states have rejected the primary caretaker presumption making West
Virginia the only state that calls for a firm primary caretaker pre-
sumption.2 19 For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected
the primary caretaker presumption even for child custody modification
proceedings, noting that it had already recognized the importance of
the parent who provides daily care, but found that a further presumption
would "overbalance the scales too far" in favor of the custodial parent
in modification proceedings.' Most states, like Louisiana, apply the
notion of "primary caretaker" as a factor among others to assist the
judge in making his or her determination in child custody. 2' Louisiana's
primary caretaker type factors include: "The love, affection, and other
emotional ties existing between the parties ... and the child," the
"length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.' 2 Article 131 also ex-
plicitly provides that when the child is to go to neither parent, the child
should continue in the home that has provided a wholesome and stable
environment.m
Miscellaneous Factors
Drugs or the Health of the Parties
Where a non-custodial party has made a significant effort to extricate
himself from drugs and the drug culture, and the other party has
216. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d at 602.
217. Id.
218. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 574, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 2131 (codified at Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 518.17 (West 1990 and Supp. 1992).
219. Crippen, supra note 202, at 439.
220. Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 621 (N.D. 1989).
221. E.g., In re Marriage of Tuttle, 660 P.2d 196, 199 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (primary
caretaker role is relevant and important); In re Marriage of Van Dyke, 618 P.2d 465,
467 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (primary caretaker role a "dominant consideration"), cited and
discussed in Crippen, supra note 202, at 438 n.38.
222. La. Civ. Code art. 131(C)(2)(a), (d).
223. La. Civ. Code art. 131(A)(3).
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continued or become more involved in drug use, this is a significant
factor allowing the former to have custody.21 Louisiana jurisprudence
has provided that the legislature created an exception to the health
provider privilege, by virtue of its enactment of Civil Code article
146(C)(2)(g), now Civil Code article 131(C)(2)(g), which makes the mental
and physical health of the parties disputing custody relevant.225
As a result, the legislature has provided a qualified privilege for
communication between a patient and his or her health care provider
in civil proceedings. This statute provides that a patient has a privilege
to refuse to disclose any communication made to a health care provider
which enables the provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the
patient except in certain instances. Statutory exceptions include custody
suits, among others.'" The disputing party's physical and mental health
are essential elements to a custody action. Evidence must be adduced
which addresses the fitness of the parties seeking custody, including the
moral, mental, and physical fitness of the parties. Medical testimony
and records form part of the best evidence of these factors.22 Confi-
dentiality may be preserved, as the court may seal the records or take
testimony in chambers. In a custody dispute, a party may obtain the
deposition of the other party's physician with regard to the contestant's
mental and physical health if it comes within the exceptions to the health
care provider privilege. 2 9
Mentally Retarded Parents
In Louisiana, a disability such as mental retardation, spina bifida,
or another health problem will be a factor to consider in awarding
custody or in determining who should be the domiciliary parent, but it
is not the sole consideration.3 0 If the health of either parent deteriorates
to the extent that the child will not properly be cared for, a modification
may be requested, but until such time as that occurs, the health difficulty
should not be determinative.
224. Cooper v. Cooper, 579 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (modification
case, where wife blatantly used drugs in children's presence, kept very poor house and
made no effort to change her ways). See also Schloegel v. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d 344
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
225. Kirkley v. Kirkley, 575 So. 2d 509, 510 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 577
So. 2d 19 (1991).
226. La. R.S. 13:3734 (1991).
227. Id.; Kirkley, 575 So. 2d at 510-11.
228. La. Civ. Code art. 131(C)(2)(f) and (g); Kirkley, 575 So. 2d at 510-11.
229. Kirkley, 575 So. 2d at 510.
230. Harper v. Harper, 559 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
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Religion & Custody
Louisiana courts have held that religion may be considered under
Civil Code article 131(C)(2)(b) under certain circumstances, such as when
a child expresses a desire to attend a particular church."'1 In LeDoux
v. LeDoux, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the non-custodial father, a Jehovah's
Witness, to refrain from exposing or permitting any other person to
expose his minor children to any religious practices or teachings incon-
sistent with the Catholic religion, the religion of the custodial mother.
There was evidence that the father's activities were having a deleterious
effect upon the children and the order was narrowly tailored. "2 ' This
case seems to illustrate the dangers of the unfettered discretion under
the "best interest" test. "[I]mportant moral and constitutional rights,
as well as a child's interest in a full relationship with his or her
noncustodial parent, may be substantially eroded under the auspices of
the discretionary rhetoric of 'best interest."'"" In Pennsylvania, on the
other hand, the superior court held that it was error for a trial court
to enforce a pre-nuptial oral agreement that the children shall be raised
in the Jewish faith and to prohibit the Catholic father from taking them
to his church meetings during visitation. The court held that parental
authority to inculcate morality and religious upbringing "may be en-
croached upon only after a showing of a 'substantial threat' of 'physical
or mental harm to the child, or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare."' ' 2 The Maine Supreme Court held that a trial court had given
undue weight to the fact that, as a Jehovah's Witness, a mother seeking
custody might not consent to a blood transfusion for the child. "If and
only if the court is satisfied that an immediate and substantial threat
to the child's well-being is posed by the religious practices in question"
can the court proceed to balance the interests. Any custody or related
order must cause the "least possible intrusion upon the constitutionally
protected interests of the parent." 3' The Alaska Supreme Court held
that a divorce court could decide whether a child has "actual religious
231. Cooper v. Louque, 551 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
232. LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d I (Neb. 1990); Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance
on Best Interest may be Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases,
15 Creighton L. Rev. 25 (1981); Mangrum, Religious Constraints During Visitation: Under
What Circumstances Are They Constitutional?, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 445 (1991).
233. Mangrum, supra note 232, at 446 (criticizing LeDoux).
234. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), citing, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1540 (1972).
235. Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Me. 1980); see also Krause, Family Law,
Black Letter Series 193 (1988).
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needs," for example, an expressed preference of a child mature enough
to make a choice among or between religions. 6
Moral Fitness of the Parent(s)
Custody actions are not designed to regulate the behavior of the
parents. The moral fitness of the parties is relevant insofar as it affects
the welfare of the child within the totality of the circumstances.237 Today,
sexual conduct, even an act of adultery, does not necessarily disqualify
a parent from being awarded custody. "3' The second circuit recently held
it was not clear error to award custody of a child from a prior marriage
to a man who was living with a woman out of wedlock, with whom
he had fathered another child, when there was no evidence in the record
indicating this had a detrimental effect on the first child.2 39 There has
developed in Louisiana jurisprudence a "Reformation Rule" which pro-
vides that "when a parent terminates an adulterous relationship either
by ceasing the immoral behavior or by marrying the paramour, that
reformation obliterates that parent's previous indiscretion and can no
longer be a factor in determining that parent's fitness for custody.' '24
Custody-Parents vs. Non-Parents
For a non-parent to be awarded custody over a parent, the court
must find that the award to the parent would be detrimental to the
child and that the award to the non-parent is necessary for the best
interests of the child.2t The term "detrimental" has been interpreted
to mean that the child would suffer positive and substantial harm, if
returned to the parent.2 2 It also "includes parental unfitness, neglect,
abuse, abandonment, and forfeiture of parental rights, and is broad
236. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979); see also Krause, supra
note 235, at 193.
237. Petrovich v. Petrovich, 513 So. 2d 411, 418 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
514 So. 2d 1179 (1987).
238. Cooper v. Cooper, 579 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
239. Id. at 1163.
240. Dykes v. Dykes, 488 So. 2d 368, 372 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So.
2d 1278 (1986), and cases cited therein; cf., Rogers v. Rogers, 577 So. 2d 761, 764 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991).
241. See old La. Civ. Code art. 146(B), now La. Civ. Code art. 131(B). In re Interest
of Minor Child Suzette Hulin, 543 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Pittman
v. Jones, 559 So. 2d 990, 993 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 451 (1990).
242. Merritt v. Merritt, 550 So. 2d 882, 889 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); see also Pittman
v. Jones, 559 So. 2d 990, 993 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 451 (1990);
Hughes v. McKenzie, 539 So. 2d 965, 970 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 542 So. 2d
1388 (1989); see generally Moreau & Ho, Child Custody Awards to Non-Parents Under
Article 146(B), 33 Loy. L. Rev. 51, 59 (1987).
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enough to include any other circumstances, such as prolonged separation
of the child from its natural parents, that would cause the child to
suffer substantial harm." 43 Where appropriate, an award of joint cus-
tody between a parent and non-parent may be preferred.'"
Does Civil Code article 131 apply to parent vs. non-parent custody
disputes? Some courts have noted that by its own terms, Article 131
(old Article 146) does not cover a custody dispute not incidental to a
divorce action. Rather, Article 131 covers custody of children pending
divorce litigation and Article 134 covers custody of children in cases of
divorce. Others have found that it does not apply directly, but it is a
useful guideline to be applied by analogy. u4 Others hold it to be directly
applicable. 2"6 It would appear that Civil Code article 131 applies when
the litigation between parent and non-parent is over a modification of
a custody order."' It is not necessary for a trial court to utilize the
word "detrimental" in its order awarding custody to a non-parent. 2
The primary consideration is the best interest of the child,249 and Civil
Code article 131(B), if it applies, allows the trial court to consider a
multitude of factors and to apply a totality of the circumstances in
making its determination of "detriment" and "best interest."' " It ap-
pears clear, however, that the legislature, by requiring a showing that
custody to a parent would be "detrimental" to the child, wanted to
control the discretion of the trial court and to support the parental
right to custody, along with the notion that the child's best interest is
best served when the child is with his or her parent, rather than a third
party. It would be a mistake to limit the term "detriment" to the point
243. Hughes, 539 So. 2d at 970, citing Moreau & Ho, supra note 242, at 59.
244. Schloegel v. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d 344, 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (joint
custody awarded between parent and child's maternal grandmother, with primary physical
custody going to the child's grandmother).
245. E.g., Pittman v. Jones, 559 So. 2d 990, 993-94 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
565 So. 2d 451 (1990). Where a child had been in the physical custody of her paternal
aunt for twelve years, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decide that
it would be detrimental to the child to be awarded to the custody of her mother.
246. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d at 345-46; Pittman, 559 So. 2d 990 (holding La. Civ. Code
art. 146(B) (now 131(B)) to be applicable to a contest between a nonparent with whom
the child had lived for a twelve year period of time and was seeking permanent custody
from the biological mother); Hughes v. McKenzie, 539 So: 2d 965, 969 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 542 So. 2d 1388 (1989).
247. See La. Civ. Code art. 134; La. Civ. Code art. 131(E); Schloegel, 584 So. 2d
at 345-46.
248. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d at 346; Batiste v. Guillory, 479 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985).
249. See Schloegel v. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d 344, 346 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Parker
v. Payton, 511 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
250. See Schloegel, 584 So. 2d at 346; Batiste, 479 So. 2d 1044; Bolding v. Bolding,
532 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
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that it would be considered "detrimental" to the child, if it is in the
best interest of the child to be with the non-parent.
Burden of Proof
The non-parent always bears the burden of proof in a custody
contest with a parent. There is a paramount right to rear one's child
with whom one has a relationship, sanctioned by the Constitution and
by the "substantial harm to the child" standard, long required in Louis-
iana and elsewhere."' It is well settled that "a parent has a paramount
right to custody of his or her child and may be deprived of such right
only for compelling reasons. In accordance with this principle, "it is
well recognized that when a parent corripetes with non-parents .. . the
parent's right to custody must be recognized unless it is established by
convincing proof that he or she is unfit or has forfeited the parental
right of custody by action or omission." ' 2 The compelling reasons must
be expressly determined and supported by-convincing proof.2 '
Problems with the Best Interest Test
The best interest standard calls for the application of different factors
and provides different weight to the factors, depending on what purpose
or policies it is serving; a question of custody after divorce will be
different from child custody modification, which, in turn will be different
from adoptions.15 ' No doubt, protecting the "best interests" of children
is a noble goal, but the vagueness and subjectivity inherent in this
standard make it difficult or "inappropriate as a guidepost."" Most
251. In re B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990); Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La.
1974); see Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989). For national and comparative
authority, both current and historical, see C. Blakesley, Chapter I, Family Autonomy,
in Wardle, Blakesley & Parker, supra note 0; and C. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law,
supra note *. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) indicates that more than biological parenthood and the
establishment of a relationship is required.
252. Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974); Love v. Love, 536 So. 2d 1278,
1280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Schloegel. 584 So. 2d 344; Gordy v. Langner, 502 So. 2d
583 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 494 (1987).
253. Schloegel, 584 So. 2d 344; Hughes v. McKenzie, 539 So. 2d 965, 969 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 542 So. 2d 1388 (1989); Pittman v. Jones, 559 So. 2d 990 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 451 (1990), each citing Wood, 290 So. 2d 675.
254. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988) (regarding the best interests
standard in the adoption setting and noting that the standard will apply differently in
each of the noted situations).
255. Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the Psychological Parenting
Theory, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 549, 553 (1983-84) (presenting several articles
rigorously criticizing the "best interest" standard and the psychological parent test). See
also Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon "In the Best Interests of the
Child," 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1096 (1988).
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of the expansive literature on child custody is not very useful in for-
mulating legal principles of general applicationY' Studies on the con-
sequences of separation and the "broken home" are usually not sufficiently
precise to provide guidance as to whether and under what circumstances
a given child should be placed in the custody of the mother, the father,
or some third party. 2 7 Those studies which are specific enough often
present dogmatically held positions in disagreement with other specific,
yet still dogmatically held positions."3' Moreover, important moral and
constitutional rights, as well as a child's interest in a full relationship
with his or her noncustodial parent, may be substantially eroded under
the auspices of the discretionary rhetoric of "best interest." 2 9 The United
States Supreme Court has not spoken definitively as to whether the best
interest test is constitutional. 2 ° In 1978, however, it noted: "We have
little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a State
were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest." 26'
Psychological Parent
What began as a vigorously and artfully argued theory relating to
what certain psychoanalysts felt was the least detrimental alternative for
children when their parental home breaks up, was promoted as the only
proper basis upon which to award custody and soon developed a life
of its own as a rule of law. The "psychological parent" concept became
256. H. Clark & C. Glowinsky, Domestic Relations: Cases & Problems 1009 (4th ed.
1990).
257. Id.
258. Compare J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. Solnit & S. Goldstein, supra note 202, with
J. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup 310-11 (1980) and J. Wallerstein & S.
Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade After Divorce (1989),
cited and discussed, in H. Clark & C. Glowinsky, supra note 256, at 1010.
259. LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d I (Neb. 1990) (where a non-custodial father
was ordered to "refrain from exposing or permitting any other person to expose his
minor children to any religious practices or teachings inconsistent with the Catholic
religion").
260. 1. M. Ellman, P. Kurtz, & K. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 1228.
261. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 555 (1978) (nevertheless
finding the best interest test appropriate, where the father had essentially forfeited his
rights by not seeking a custodial relationship with his child), quoting Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63,
97 S. Ct. 2094, 2119 (1977), as quoted in I. M. ElIman, P. Kurtz & K. Bartlett, supra
note 7, at 1228.
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the essence of the legal term: the best interest of the child. 2 The test,
however, is not without significant detractors; it is controversial even
within the social, behavioral, and medical sciences. Most of the dire
consequences forecast by the psychoanalytical promoters of the theory
are not supported by the data.2 63 The Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry's prestigious Committee on the Family produced a volume
on this subject, noting:
The evidence and our own experience lead us to what can
be called the family perspective on divorce and custody. Briefly,
that perspective rests on the following concepts. A couple that
comes together to form a family and raise children creates for
those children something that is more than the sum of its parts-
more than the dyadic relations one-on-one with mother and
separately with father. We find no evidence for the existence
of a single "psychological parent" with whom the tie is critically
more important than with the rest of the network.
The relationships with mother and father, and with grand-
parents and others as well, constitute an emotional universe that,
especially in the early years, forms a pattern for the child's later
relations.
If, in the crisis of divorce, one part of that universe is cut
off, labeled as bad, and becomes unavailable, there will be
adverse consequences for the child's view of himself and of the
people he will relate to later in life.
Even if the person who is cut off is a very ambivalently
held parent with whom contact is difficult and painful, our
experience and the evidence convince us that the later ability to
put that relationship in emotional perspective is better served
through contact than through separation. 26
Notwithstanding this challenge, courts have constantly applied this
psychoanalytical theory as if it were true in order to restrict the con-
262. See excellent analysis and critique of this development by Professor and former
family law judge Peggy C. Davis, in her Harvard Law Review article, Davis, "There is
a Book Out .. .": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 1539 (1987). The theory was first presented in the Yale Law Journal at Note,
Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73
Yale L.J. 151, and shortly thereafter in J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. Solnit & S. Goldstein,
supra note 202.
263. Waters & Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment Theory: The Child's
Best Interests and the Risks of Doing the Right Things for the Wrong Reasons, 12 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 505 (1983-84).
264. Committee on the Family of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, New
Trends in Child Custody Determinations 80-81 (1980); Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power
to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 557, 569 (1983-84).
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stitutional interests of parents and children. 6 Professor Davis appro-
priately warns that while
[a] controversial theory may appropriately serve as background
for drawing factual conclusions in the course of applying an
established rule of law, yet use of the same theory as a legislative
fact may be entirely unwarranted .... In the context of an-
nouncing law, . . . the court should supplement [the evidence
of experts who believe in psychological parenthood, etc.] ...
with close examination of the social function served by a tra-
dition of assigning responsibility on the basis of biological par-
entage (and the social costs of diluting the effect of that
assignment), and recognize that scientific consensus concerning
the expert's causal judgment may be lacking or temporary.2"
Justice Dennis, in his majority opinion in In re J.M.P. 67 noted
that "[tihe court should prefer a psychological parent (i.e., an adult
who has a psychological relationship with the child from the child's
perspective) over any claimant (including a natural parent) who, from
the child's perspective, is not a psychological parent." 2" Justice Dennis
also stated that "[t]o award custody to a person who is a 'stranger' to
the child would unnecessarily risk harming the child where the other
claimant has, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, fulfilled the child's
psychological needs for a parent as well as his physical need." 269 This
is a wholesale adoption of Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit's psychoanalytical
vision of the psychological parent that, "Whether any adult becomes
the psychological parent of a child is based on day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and shared experiences.... Thus, neither the biological
relation nor the fact of legal adoption is any guarantee that an adult
will become the psychological parent of a child." 270
Although Justice Dennis cites some judicial decisions and
commentators2 ' for the proposition that "[tJhere is little disagreement
within the profession of child psychology as to the existence of the
phenomenon of the child-psychological parent relationship and its im-
portance to the development of the child, ' 272 in reality, it is essentially
265. See Davis, Family Bonds, supra note 264, at 560-62; Davis, Judicial Absorption,
supra note 262, at 1580.
266. Davis, Judicial Absorption, supra note 262, at 1602.
267. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1012-17 (La. 1988).
268. Id. at 1013.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1013. On the subject in general, see discussion in C. Blakesley, Louisiana
Family Law, supra note 0; and L. Wardle, C. Blakesley, J. Parker, supra note *, at
chs. 28 and 39.
271. E.g., Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985) (citing J. Goldstein,
A. Freud & A. Solnit, Before the Best Interest of the Child 31-35 (1979).
272. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1014 (La. 1988).
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only within the psychoanalytic school of psychiatry itself that there is
little disagreement. Still, there is not much doubt, as Justice Dennis
indicates, that disruption of the parent-child relationship is at the very
least detrimental. 27" The essential disagreement relates to how great the
significant risks are in comparison with other factors influencing a child's
mental and emotional growth. " 4 It does not necessarily follow that the
psychoanalytic vision of the psychological parent is accurate or so mean-
ingful as to dominate the decision-making process relating to child
custody, termination of parental authority, or adoption. Professor and
former family law judge, Peggy Davis,"' has noted, for example, "In
sum, the inconclusiveness of separation research undermines the notion
that the continuity of care is entitled to the nearly single-minded focus
it has been given in our efforts to reform foster care systems." ' 76
Justice Dennis limited his discussion of the psychological parent
theory to the adoption context because, even though it may even be
problematic in that context, it is more clearly controversial in other
settings. He correctly emphasized that the psychological parent theory,
or at least the guidelines that he distilled out of that theory in J.M.P.,
are not as meaningful in other settings relating to child rearing.2 7  He
states that "[p]sychologists and psychiatrists can rather consistently dif-
ferentiate between a situation where an adult and a child have a sub-
stantial psychological relationship and that where there is no relationship
at all. But existing psychological theories do not provide the basis for
choosing generally between two adults where the child has some rela-
tionship and psychological attachment to each.' '128 The psychoanalytic
theory of the psychological parent, however, may raise problems in any
context.
Child Custody-Modification
The standard for modification of custody decrees is "the best interest
of the child. ' ' 279 When a trial court has made a considered decree of
permanent custody, the party seeking a change bears a heavy burden
of proving that a material change in circumstances, which significantly
affects the well-being of the child, has occurred since the original custody
decree.280 This Bergeron heavy burden rule and the appellate review
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1014.
275. Davis, Family Bonds, supra note 264 at 557.
276. Id. at 566.
277. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988).
278. Id.
279. La. Civ. Code art. 131(E); Lee v. Davis, 579 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1991).
280. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986); Lee, 579 So. 2d at 1132;
Smith v. Smith, 559 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
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standard apply to any petition to modify custody, regardless of whether
it is joint or sole custody."' The heart of the Bergeron heavy burden
rule and the high standard of appellate review is the concern that a
child's interest and welfare could be irreparably damaged by mistaken
changes in custody or even by the effects of attempted or threatened
change of custody on grounds that are less than imperative. Children
need to be protected from the detrimental effects of standards for custody
change that are too liberal. 22 This approach recognizes the possible harm
done in continued litigation and relitigation, and it incorporates the need
for stability of environment.28 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court has in-
corporated this principle by requiring that to modify a considered custody
decree, one must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the child as to
justify a modification. The harm likely to be caused by the change in
environment must be substantially outweighed by its advantages. 2"u The
great discretion of the trial court in custody matters should not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.3 s
Where there has been no considered decree, such as when the parties
simply consented to the arrangement, or it was simply stipulated to and
no evidence regarding the fitness of the parents for custody was admitted,
the heavy burden of proof required by Bergeron is not applicable. The
party seeking the modification still must prove that a change of cir-
cumstances has occurred since the original decree and that the modi-
fication is in the best interest of the child, 2" which includes consideration
of the impact of instability due to the change and the loss of the current
locus of authority.
Visitation
Civil Code article 132287 provides that a parent who is not granted
custody or joint custody of a child is entitled to reasonable visitation
281. Plunkett v. Plunkett, 576 So. 2d 100, 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
282. Id.
283. Favaloro v. Cooper, 562 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
284. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986); Jackson v. Jackson, 573 So.
2d 217, 217-18 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Cooper, 579 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991); McGee v. McGee, 552 So. 2d 576, 578 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989);
Palazzo v. Coe, 562 So. 2d 1137, 1139 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 611
(1990); Parker v. Parker, 559 So. 2d 37, 38 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (court must consider
the elements of Bergeron in light of the best interest of the child); Favaloro v. Cooper,
562 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
285. Jackson v. Jackson, 573 So. 2d 217, 218 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
286. Linder v. Linder, 569 So. 2d 173, 175 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990); Milligan v.
Milligan, 559 So. 2d 6, 8 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990); Cooper, 579 So. 2d at 1162; Lee v.
Davis, 579 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); McGee, 552 So. 2d at 578;
Simmons v. Simmons, 554 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
287. La. Civ. Code art. 132 was former article 146.1, added by 1988 La. Acts No.
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rights, unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would not
be in the best interest of the child. Noncustodial parents have been held
to have a constitutional right to visitation. 28 Any relative by blood or
affinity not granted custody of the child may be granted reasonable
visitation rights if the court finds that it is in the best interest of the
child.8 9
The test for visitation was established by the leading decision on
visitation.19° It requires essentially that a parent not granted sole or joint
custody of a child be entitled to reasonable visitation rights, unless the
court determines that visitation would seriously endanger the physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health of the child. Both the possible harm
and the risk of its occurrence need to be substantial. That case also
provided that this standard be applied to custody of legitimate and
illegitimate children. It is error for a trial court to burden a father with
restrictive visitation terms, including geographical limitations, when there
is no evidence of danger to the child, even though the father is 1000
miles from the mother. The child's best interest requires significant
contact with both parents, if there is no reason that such contact will
be harmful. Fear of violation of custody rights is not enough to impinge
upon the father's right to significant visitation privileges. 29' Where there
is animosity and bickering between the parents, it may be necessary to
establish a fixed visitation schedule which will have to be rigorously
adhered to. 92 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:573 provides:
Upon presentation of a certified copy of a custody and visitation
rights order rendered by a court of this state, together with .the
sworn affidavit of the custodial parent in which the custodial
parent: (1) [a]ffirms that the custody and visitation rights order
is true and correct; (2) [dJescribes the status of any pending
custody proceeding; (3) [s]ets forth the facts of the removal of
or failure to return the child in violation of the custody and
817, § 1, effective, July 18, 1988. Article 146.1, has been redesignated as Article 132,
by the Louisiana State Law Institute, pursuant to 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990
La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, both effective, January I, 1991. Article 147, added by 1986
La. Acts No. 966, § 1, amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 546, § I, was redesignated as
La. Civ. Code art. 133, pursuant to 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, effective January 1,
1991, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, effective January 1, 1991.
288. See, e.g., Rufally v. Civilletti, 539 F. Supp. 949, 951-52 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (damages
sought by non-custodial parent for violation of right to visitation by the federal protected
witness program).
289. La. Civ. Code art. 132, see supra note 287. The UCCJA, La. R.S. 13:1700-1724
(1983 and Supp. 1991), and the PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1991), control
issues of jurisdiction over custody matters.
290. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983).
291. Schelldorf v. Schelldorf, 568 So. 2d 168, 171-72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
292. Id. at 172.
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visitation rights order; and (4) [djeclares that the custodial parent
desires the child returned; Itihe judge, who shall have jurisdiction
for the limited purpose of effectuating the remedy provided by
this Section by virtue of either the presence of the child or
litigation pending before the court, may issue a civil warrant
directed to law enforcement authorities to return the child to
the custodial parent pending further order of the court having
jurisdiction over the matter.
Children's Code articles 1264-1269 provide for grandparent visitation
after the adoption of their grandchildren, where they prove that they
have been unreasonably denied visitation rights and that limited visitation
rights would be in the best interest of the children.2 93 Visitation by
individuals other than parents has depended on the degree of consan-
guinity with the child.2
Visitation-A bused Children"'
When a court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
parent has subjected his or her child to cruel physical abuse, or sexual
abuse or exploitation, the court shall prohibit visitation between the
abusive parent and the child, until that parent proves that visitation
would not cause physical, emotional, or psychological damage to the
child. If visitation is ever approved, the court shall order necessary
restrictions and protections with all costs to the abusive parent. Also,
after visitation has been prohibited and later reinstituted, the formerly
prohibited parent shall not remove the child from the jurisdiction, except
for good cause and with prior judicial approval. 29
293. La. Ch.C. art. 1267.
294. La. Civ. Code arts. 134(B) and 132 (old La. Civ. Code art. 157(B) was redesignated
as Article 134, by the Louisiana State Law Institute pursuant to 1990 La. Acts No. 1008,
§ 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, effective Jan. 1, 1991); La. R.S. 9:572 (1987).
295. La. Civ. Code art. 133. La. Civ. Code art. 147, was redesignated as La. Civ.
Code art. 133, by the Louisiana State Law Institute pursuant to 1990 La. Acts No. 1008,
§ 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, both effective January 1, 1991.
296. See also La. R.S. 9:574 (1991). For analysis of adoption and proof of paternity,
see C. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note .
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